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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM
December 5, 1986 Conference
List l, Sheet l
No.86-509-ADX
Bowen (Secretary of HHS)

W.D.N.C.

(McMillan)

O'K

v.
Gilliard,

~. (A~DC

recipie ~

Federal/Civil

Timel y

No. 86-564-AD£}1<-

~

Kirk,
(Secretary
of N~t. of Human
Resources and other
v.state

off~
icials~\<_

Gilli~r~,

t

al

(AFDC
Same

rec1p1ent
l.
U.S.C.

Same

SUMMARY:

Same

In No. 86-509, the United States argues that 42

§602(a) (38),

which

requires

that

the

f

all

parents, sisters, and brothers ~~ ving together be considered for
~ -~

purposes of determining the amount of assistance a family should

~~ G~~j

Y2~

•> •

- 2 receive from the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)

Clause, or the Equal Protection component of
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

In No.

the Due Process

86-564,

North Carolina

officials adopt that argument and contend in addition that the d
ct improperly ordered them to pay retroactive AFDC benefits out
of the state treasury, in violation of the Eleventh Amendment.
2.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW:

In 1971, the State of North
~t

j,

Carolina adopted regulations that required chriu-support income
to be considered as a" \ amily resour? e in the computation of a

-------

~

family's eligibility for AFDC benefits.

Those regulations were

found to be inconsistent with the federal statutory scheme then
in

effect,

and

the

indirectly reducing,

State

was

enjoined

or continuing

to

from

reduce,

"directly

or

withholding,

or

continuing to withhold, the payment to AFDC beneficiaries of any
funds on the basis of crediting outside income or resources of
one

or

more

members

of

the

family

group

without

first

determining that such income is legally available to all members
of

the

family

group."

Gi 11 i a r d

v.

Craig ,

3 31 F •

s u pp .

58 7

(W.D.N.C. 1971), aff'd without opinion, 409 U.S. 807 (1972).

In

1984, Congress amended the statutes governing the AFDC program.
One of the amendments,

now codified at 42

u.s.c.

§602(a) (38),

provided that the income of any parent or sibling who lives with
a

dependent

child

must

be

included

in

eligibility of the family for AFDC benefits.

determining

the

The federal govt

promulgated regulations to implement this requirement, and the
State followed suit.

The State began applying its regulations

-

3 -

in October 1984, without attempting
lifted.

In May of

plaintiff

class

in

19 85,

t~

appellees,

Gi 11 i ard

v.

get the 1971 injunction

who were members of

Craig,

enforcement of the 1971 injunction.

moved

the

d

the

ct

for

State officials, appellants

here, subsequently moved for relief from the injunction on the
ground that federal statutes and regulations required the State
to act inconsistently with the terms of 1971 injunction.

They

also filed a third-party complaint against the Secretary of HHS,
asking that the federal govt share any liability.

In May 1986,

th e d ct held that the State had violated the 1971 injunction,
and ordered it to pay out to class members the AFDC benefits
that had been withheld.

Even if §602(a) (38)

had

removed

the

le gal justification for the 1971 injunction, the d ct held, the
State was required to abide by the terms of the injunction until
it was lifted by the court.
injunct ion

prospectively.

The d ct also refused to lift the
Although

§602(a) (38)

did

authorize

the federal and state governments to issue the regulatjons they
issued,

that provision was unconstitutional, and therefore the

injunct ion remained in ef feet.

The d ct' s

first object ion to

§602(a) (38)

was that it was an unconstitutional taking.

State

(and

law

arrangements)

sometimes

pursuant

to

private

Under

contractual

the child on whose behalf child-support is being

paid has a right that that child-support be used solely for her
or

his benefit.

u.s.c.

Section §602(a) (38),

in combination with 42

§602 (a) (26) (A), which requires that participants in AFDC

programs

assign

to

support

payments,

the

state

together

their

operate

rights
to

to

ensure

receive
that

child-

any child

....

- 4 whose parent participates in the AFDC program will lose her or
his right to have child-support payments used solely for her or
his benefit.

That loss of a right is a taking, even though AFDC

program is nominally voluntary, since the child has no choice as
to

whether

or

not

to

participate

in

the AFDC

impoverished mothers have no real choice.
that §602 (a) (38)
Protection
Amendment.

program,

Th ~

and

ct also held

violated the Due Process Clause and the Equal

component of

the Due Process Clause of

the

Fifth

The statute confronts those who wish to participate

in the AFDC program with the harsh choice of either sacrificing
one of

their

children's

rights

to child support

in order

to

obtain AFDC benefits for the rest of their children or sending
the

child

who

receives

child

support

to

live

elsewhere;

in

virtue of this substantial effect upon the ability of families
to stay together, the statute therefore is properly subjected to
heightened

scrutiny.

that scrutiny.

Furthermore,

the

~ atute

cannot survive

The govt's sole purpose in enacting the statute

is to save money, but that goal cannot be achieved at the cost
of

the

integrity of the family and the rights of children to

receive child support.
After

the

appellants

filed

an

unsuccessful

motion

for

reconsideration, they brought this appeal.
3.

CONTENTIONS:

In No.

86-509:

( 1)

The d ct improperly

held that §602(a) (38) was an unconstitutional taking.
voluntary program.

It is true that §602(a) (38)

AFDC is a

imposes a new

condition on families that seek to participate in that program,
i.e.,

that they must assign to the state the right to receive

- 5 -

child-support payments of all children , l .iving with them, rather
than

just of

dependents.

all children

that

they wish

to claim as needy

But it is has never been and could not properly be

held that the government takes property from someone that
rationally

requires

to

give

up

property

receiving a benefit from the state.
held that the

(2)

impact of §602(a) (38)

as

a

condition

it
of

The d ct improperly

on family-based decisions

was so great as to justify subjecting it to heightened scrutiny
under the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection component
of

the

Due Precess Clause of

Castillo,

106

S.

Ct.

2727

the Fifth Amendment.
(1986),

expressly

Lyng

held

v.

that

governmental actions that do not "directly and substantially"
inte.c.::: c re

with

family based decisions should be subjected to

rationality

review

rather

than

heightened

§602(a) (38)

does not give rise to such interference.

§602(a) (38)

is clearly

legislative

judgment that families

substantial

outside

rational;

income

are

scrutiny.

it expresses

the

Section
Moreover,

reasonable

that contain a member with

generally

less

needy

than

families without such a member.
In No. 86-546:

The State reiterates most of the contentions

advanced by the govt in No.

86-509.

The State also contends,

however, that the d ct improperly held that it had violated the
1971
State

injunct ion.
only

from

That
acting

statutes governing
those statutes,

injunct ion essentially
in

ways

that

the AFDC program.

violated

pro hi bi ted
the

After Congress

the

federal
amended

the action that had been made unlawful by the

injunct ion was no lange r unlawful.

In any event, even if the

- 6 State did violate the injunction, the Eleventh
Amendment forbids
' .
the

d

ct

from

ordering

the

State

to

pay

retroactive

AFDC

benefits out of the State treasury.
Appellees concede that probable jurisdiction should be noted
in No. 86-509 and over question 1 in No. 86-546, but argue that
the d ct' s

order

requiring

the State to pay retroactive AFDC

benefits should be summarily affirmed.

It

State

which by

in fact

violated

that

injunction,

is clear

that

the

its precise

terms forbid what the State did pursuant to the regulations it
promulgated

to

implement

§602(a) (38).

Nor

is

the

State's

failure to seek to have the injunction lifted justified by the
passage

of

§602(a) (38).

Cf.,

e.g.,

Birmingham,

388

u.s.

is

the

Eleventh Amendment

whether

punish

violations

307,

of

314

Walker

(1967).

injunctions

Thus,

permits
by

v.

City

of

the only question
federal

requiring

the

courts

to

State

to

compensate those whom the State injures through its violation of
the

injunction.

Hutto

v.

Finney,

437

u.s.

678,

691

(1978),

expressly holds that the Eleventh Amendment does.
The State's

response

attempts

to distinguish Hutto on the

ground that it involved an award of bad-faith attorneys'

fees,

not retroactive relief.
4.

DISCUSSION:

jurisdiction in No.
The questions of

The

Court

clearly

should

note

probable

86-509 and over question 1 in No.

86-564.

the constitutionality of §602(a) (38)

and the

statutory validity of

the

regulations HHS

and

state agencies

have promulgated to implement it are being intensively litigated
in

the

---lower

courts.

By

the

~-------------------------~)
govt' s count, the govt has

-

prevailed

in

d

ct,

either

7 -

on

the

merits

or

on motion

for

preliminary injunction, in eleven such suits; at least one other
d

~

ct has held §602(a) (38)

other d cts have

to be

unconstitutional;

relied upon statutory grounds

to

and

seven

-

invalidate

~-----------------------------------------------------~

state and federal regulations adopted to implement §602(a) (38).
(Appellees'

count of the decisions below is somewhat different,

but the details hardly matter.)

Although there are some obvious

difficulties in the analysis relied upon by the d ct below, in
light of the importance of the questions presented and the deep
divisions among the lower courts that have heard the question, I
don't believe that summary

d~s~ition

The State's challenge in

~o.

would be appropriate.

86-564 to the validity of the d

ct's order that the State pay retroactive AFDC benefits as a
sanction

for

matter.

I

violating

find

the

appellees'

1971

injunction

argument

that

is

this

judgment is correct to be pretty persuasive.
'

l

I

a

different

part

of

the

think that the

'

State in fact violated

the 1971 injunction,

that the State's

---------~-----------~-----------------failure
to seek to have the injunction lifted was not justified
by the passage of §602(a) (38), and that the Eleventh Amendment
permits federal

courts to punish violations of injunctions by

requiring the State to compensate those whom the State injures
through its violation of the injunction.

Nevertheless, I'm not

sure that the question is so clear that summary affirmance would
be appropriate.

In any event, if the Court were convinced that

this part of the d ct's decision was correct,
briefing to the other
5.

RECOMMENDATION:

q ~ ions

it could limit

raised by the parties.

Note probable jurisdiction in Nos.

86-

- 8 509 and 86-564.

There is a response and a reply from the State appellants.
IFP status of the appellees appears proper.
November 26, 1986

McLeese

Opn in petn

rjm 11/28/86

tr.

~~ ~k~~ .

~~~I@ a_~

SUPPLEMENT TO POOL MEMORANDUM
To:

Justice Powell

From:

Ronald

November 28, 1986

Nos. 86-509, Bowen v. Gilliard; -564, Kirk v. Gilliard

This is the rare case that deserves to be in the appelv
The de declared a congressional statute unlate jurisdiction.
constitutional.

This is not the only court to find the statute

unconstitutional, but other courts have found the statute constitutional.

The decision below is almost certainly wrong, but in

light of the conflicting holdings
reversal

is

probably

in the lower courts,

inappropriate.

Thus,

note No. 86-509, and question 1 in No. 86-564.

you

clearly

summary
should

L..

Question 2 in 86-564 is

im~ar

cials had

WDNC enjoined the program,
existing federal statute.

entirel~

separate.

program in 1971.

The NC offiAt that time,

because it conflicted with the then
When the new statute was passed,

NC

officials acted immediately to implement it, without having the
injunction lifted.
not bar

The~

held that the Eleventh Amendment did

it from ordering NC officials to pay retroactively for

the benefits they withheld in reliance on the new federal statute;

they should have had the injunction lifted.

V

The pool memo

writer thinks this is correct, but close enough to recommend notation of jurisdiction.

I cannot believe this is correct.
------------------~'-

sidering the complexity of the area,
most

certainly

presents a

inappropriate.

rather unusual fact

Con-

~

summary disposition is al-

Thus,

although

situation,

I

this

question

recommend that you

note jurisdiction over the question.
I recommend that you note both cases in the entirety.

December 5, 1986
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BENCH MEMORANDUM

To:
From:

April 6, 1987

Justice Powell
Leslie

No. 86-509, 564, Bowen/Kirk v. Gilliard
Cert. to DC (W.D. N.C.)

(McMillan, J.)

Wednesday, April 22, 1987 (second argument)
I. Summary
The

questions

presented

in

this

case

are:

(1)

whether a federal statutory provision that requires that the
support payments made to a child iri a family in which other
children receive AFDC payments be included in the total family income for purposes of ·calculating the total AFDC payments for the family is unconstitutional as a taking of the
child's property or a violation of the Due Process Clause or
Equal Protection Clause; and ( 2) whether . the Eleventh Amend-

J

1:'" - J -

ment bars the DC's order that the state petrs make retroactive payments to resps.
II.

Background

The DC previously enjoined the state petrs from reducing or withholding "the payment of AFDC benefits ... because

of

the

presumed

availability

to

an

AFDC

family

of

[child] support payments which belong to one or more but
not
---/
all

members

Supp.

587,

of

that

593-594

family."

(W.D.N.C.

Gilliard

409

injunction remains in effect.

~971

are members

of

the

same

class

Craig,

331

F.

That decision was ap-

1971).

pealed to this Court and was affirmed.
The

v.

u.s.

807 (1972).

Resps in this case

that was

granted

relief

in

1971 -- that is, children of low income mothers who brought

=
suit

through

their

mothers.

They

filed

suit

seeking

the

same sort of relief that was granted in 1971.
This new suit is occasioned by new regulations promulgated
"Stan~ard

by

the

state

petrs.

These

regulations

define

a

Filing Unit" for AFDC benefits as follows:

A.
The parent and all minor children who are
brothers and sisters, including half-brothers and
sisters, and who qre living toget~er must be included in the same •lassis'"E""a nce unit ~unless:
1.

The parent or child is an SSI [social security
recipient, ~

be ~ ts]

2.
The parent or child does not meet all eligibility factors with the exception of income and
reserve.
Do not exclude a parent or child because
of the amount of income or reserve he has.
1985 State AFDC Manual §2360 III A.
is used

to

calculate

The "assistance unit"

the AFDC benefits. to be

paid

to

its

members.

The income of all members of the assistance unit

is counted as available

to the whole u'n it.

State

regula-

7

tions require that the caretaker of the members of an AFDC
filing unit assign to the state any rights to support owed
or paid on behalf of any members of the filing unit.
The state claims that the new regulations were
quired by a new federal enactment, 42

u.s.c.

part of the 1984 Deficit Reduction Act

re-

§602(a)(38), a

(DEFRA).

This sec-

tion provides that a state AFDC plan must include the income
available to all dependent children in a filing unit in calcula~ing

the amount of AFDC payments

entitled.

to which the unit

is

~

This section of the DEFRA provides that the first

?

"

$50 of any child support payments received in each month by
any dependent child shall be disregarded in making the calculation.
Resps claimed that application of the new state regulation so as to reduce AFDC payments to families

in which

children receive child support payments viola ted the
of the 1971 injunction.
violation

because

state

filed

petrs

for

a

of

The state claims that there is no

the

third-party

contribution

terms

if

operation
complaint
the

DC

of

federal
against

required

the

law.
the

The

-

federal

payment

of

additional benefits.
The DC first

interpreted the language and leg isla- L) c:::._

tive history of the federal statute and determined that the
federal requirement that child support payments be including
in the resources of an AFDC filing unit . preempted any state

!Jk'

~~

law to the contrary.

r

tiona! implications of this interpretation.

The court con-

.......

eluded

that

the

-

The DC then addressed the consti tu-

requirement

that an AFDC
J

applicant

assign
L(_

l

child support income to the state effected a taking of the
child's property without just compensation because it denied
the

child

funds.

unrestricted

to

his

own

child

support

The taking occurs because children who receive child

support payments are
portion of their
needy

access

AFDC expenditures."

child's

significant

income to the state in the name of their

half-siblings

ment constitutes

required "to contribute a

in

order

Pet. App.

to

reduce

68a-69a.

state

and

The forced assign-

"an unconstitutional tax on the

membership

in

a

particular

federal

type

of

supported

family

unit."

Id., at 61a, 74a.
The

DC

next

found

that

the

filing

unit

provision

violates the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses.
court did not apply the usual

rational basis test,

The

but in-

stead . determined that "[t]he impact of [Congress'] action on
the child's fundamental associational rights and on a property right
SSa.

requires a more

rigorous examination."

at

The court found that the statute burdened family rela-

tionships.
recognition

It

concluded,

"The

and

protection

of

prevent the state and federal
dren' s

Id.,

unchosen membership

Constitution's

family

consistent

associational

rights

governments from using chil-

in a· family

that

includes AFDC

dependent half-sisters and brothers as the justification for
the deprivation of property."

Id., at 8.9 a.

In a clarifying

/.1~+

J:::::. ~ ~- )

~~~-

.

- · -;;) -

order,

the

DC

indicated

that

the

deprivation
mem~ership

based on a child's unchosen family
process

and equal

of

violates due

The

protection principles.

property

DC

enjoined

the Federal Government from requiring the states to include
child

support

resources

in

The DC denied a motion for
decision in~ v.

the

AFDC

payment

calculation.

rehearing based on this Court's

Castillo,

106 S.

Ct.

2727

(1986), dis-

tinguishing this decision on the ground that the AFDC statute penalizes persons "who are not free to change their living arrangements
find~ng

to preserve

or augment

their

income"

and

the statute as confronting children with the choice

"between

parental

relationships

and

financial

survival."

Id., at 109a.
III.
A.

Analysis

Statutory Construction

Resps argue that the
susceptible of two
that

~ongress

federal

interpretations.

statute is

reasonably

One interpretation is

did not intend to override state domestic re-

lations law and require unwilling children to assign their
child support payments to the state.

Because of the serious

constitutional questions raised, resps argue that this Court
should adopt a limiting construction of the statute.
~~

argument is strained.

First,

Resps'

the Secretary of HHS has in-

terpreted the statute to mean that "an application with respect to a dependent child must · also include,
the

same

household

and otherwise

eligible

for

if living in
assistance:

[a]ny blood-related or adoptive brother or sister."

45

CFR §206.10(a) (!)(vii) (B).

The agency's

interpretation of

the statute it is charged with administering, if reasonable,
is entitled to deference.

the language of the stat-

-----.

ute itself provides that the children that must be included
---r
in an AFDC filing are those "deprived of parental support or
care."

Resps' argument that children who receive child sup-

port payments are not deprived of support fails to recognize
that they are deprived of care, and the two words are listed
in

the

disjunctive

-

Congress

in

the

statute.

specifically exempted

--

--------- \.._..

the

Most
first

telling
$50

of

is

any

that
child

suppqrt payment from inclusion in the AFDC calculation.
purpose was
exclude

to

members

benefits,

"end

the

with

and [to]

present practice whereby

income

in

order

to

The

families

maximize

family

ensure that the income of families that

live together and share expenses is

recognized and counted

as available to the family as a whole."

s.

Rep. No. 98-169.

Congress also specifically provided that the social security
benefits

of

disabled

AFDC determination.

children

is

to

be

excluded

from

the

Thus, all indications are that Congress

intended child support income to be included in an AFDC application.
_---..

Where

the

statute

and legislative

history are

- s~~
~

.-&1

clear, there is no room for adopting a limiting construction

~-~4-y...€_

of the statute, even if it were necessary to avoid reaching

~.t<..a. --.A-'

constitutional issues, as resps suggest.
B.

Takings · clause

The SG is correct that resps' argument, and the DC's
holding, that the AFDC provision effects . an unconstitutional

page 7.
taking

is difficult

to

address.

The

DC

found

that under

North Carolina law the child support payments are the private property of the child, and that the child has a

right

to receive the full amount of the support payments for his
exclusive use.

The DC's theory is that a child's caretaker

~

acts as his trustee in administering the child support payments for the child's exclusive use, and that the state assignment provision "takes" the property and reassigns it for
the mutual use of all members of the household.

Thus, "[a]s

a result of the ... regulations, a child previously entitled
to cnild support has lost the right to enforce the fiduciary
obligation that prohibited the mother from spending the money on anyone other than the designated child."
A-55.

Juris. App.

The court observed that the right to exclude others

is generally "one of the most essential sticks in the bundle
of rights commonly characterized as property."
v. United States,

444

u.s.

164, 176 (1979).

Kaiser Aetna
It found that

the state and federal governments had destroyed the value of
this right.

Moreover,

it destroyed this right on the basis

of the composition of the child's family,

a basis it found

constitutionally impermissible.

--

The DC's reading of North Carolina law appears undu-

-

ly strict, as pointed out by the state.

-----

payments are

for

the benefit of the

While child support

child,

the mother

re-

tains discretion as to how to use the money to "benefit" the
child.
pooling

The
the

AFDC
family

program

gives

resources

the

mother

to benefit all

the

option

children,

of
in-

bC:3
~~

page o.
eluding the children receiving child support payments.

It

is difficult to say that giving a mother ' this option "takes"
the child's property in a constitutional sense.
There is no
LI
oJ..
strong reason why child support payments should be treated
differently than any other income that a child might have.
A holding

that

all

independent

income

of

family

members

should be exempt from disclosure would subvert the purpose
of

the

needy.

government

aid

program

that

is

to

aid

the

truly

The logical result of the DC's holding would be that

the government must calculate each individual's need separate~y

for government aid programs in order to avoid "tak~~?1.-dK-~
ing" the property of other individuals.
This cannot be correct.
These considerations analyzed under the traditional
takings
payments

test
of

indicate
family

that

members

considering
is

not

a

the

taking.

child

support

First,

the

character of the government action is a voluntary government
aid

p~ogram.

While it may be true that the child does not

choose to participate,

his guardian does.

Second,

the ef-

feet of the government action is to return the child support
money to the child in the altered form of AFDC payments.

To

a significant extent, the child still obtains the full benefit of the funds.

Third,

the inte rfe renee with reasonable

investment-backed expectations
as a minor,

is

reduced because a

child,

does not really have complete control over his

child support payments.

There is discretion with the guard-

ian to use to money in his best

interest~,

which may reason-

ably include

pooling

the

money

for

the

use

of

the

family

unit.

-

The SG also maintains that the fact that the money
is returned to the child in the form of AFDC payments constitutes

just

payments are

Moreover,

compensation.
assigned

to

burden of nonpayment.

the

state,

Finally,

the

when

child

support

the

state assumes

the

$50

exemption for

the

payments provides significant compensation.

B.

Due Process/Equal Protection Clause

Just last term, this Court decided

~

v. Castillo.

The question presented in that case was whether the federal
,..,...... A. ;:;:;;,._

food

stamp statute

that

treats

parents,

children and

sib-

lings who live together as a single "household" but applies
a

different

standard

to

more

distant

relatives

and

nonrelated persons who live together violated the Due Process or Equal Protection Clause.
erred

in

that

--

standard.
pect'

or

case

in

The Court found that the DC

applying

a

"heightened

scrutiny"

It found that "[c]lose relatives are not a

'quasi-suspect'

class."

106

s.

Ct.,

'sus-

at 2729.

also found that "the statutory classification [did not]
rectly and substantially'

omitted).

The

'di-

interfere with family living ar-

rangements and thereby burden a
(citation

It

fundamental

"household"

right."

definition

Ibid.
did

not

order or prevent any group of persons from dining together.
Under the rational basis test, the classification was proper
as a reasonable reflection of family practices and an effort
to prevent fraud.

It noted that "the

~est-ineffectiveness

&.1

of case-by-case verification of claims that individuals ate
as

separate

households

unquestionably warrants

general definitions in this area."
Court

concluded

that

Congress

the

use

Id., at 2730-2731.

could

rationally

of
The

determine

that the two groups -- close and distant family -- warranted
different treatment.
In ruling on the motion · for
~·

tinguished

rehearing,

First, it found that

nution of a government benefit.

Here,

~

the DC dis-

concerned dimi-

the diminution is of

the child support payments, which are not a government benefit.

Second,

it found the deprivation in this case to be

more severe than in

~·

It noted that this case is closer

to United States Department of Agriculture v.
U.S.

528

(1973)

where

the definition of a

Moreno,

413

family eligible

for food stamps completely disqualified families that failed
to meet the definition.

Third,

the court found the provi-

sion at issue unacceptable because it penalized children who
were not free to change their living arrangements.
The order does not directly address the scrutiny to
be

applied

~'

to

the

classification

at

issue.

In

light

of

it appears that the DC's use of "heightened scrutiny"

is wrong.

Under the rational basis standard, this classifi-

cation appears to pass muster.

The legislative history in-

dicates that Congress was faced with a need to reduce benefit payments.
members

who

It chose to recognize the reality that family
live

together

derive

association and frequently pool

benefits

resourc~s.

because

of

the

The judgment to

page

include all
rational
needy.

income

at tempt

of all

to

family members

direct

scarce

appears

resources

at

to
the

be

.l.l.

a

truly

The "burden" on the family members' ability to live
~·

together appears very similar to that in

While it is

conceivable that the AFDC provision may affect some living
arrangements, it is practically unlikely and not significant
enough to violate the Constitution.
C.
The

-

DC

Eleventh Amendment

ordered

the

state

to

pay

all

retroactive

benefits to which the resps would have been entitled but for
the new filing provision, and to pay back all child support
payments assigned to the state.

On the merits,

the

state

petrs argue that this order for retroactive payment is erroneous~

The DC based the payment on the state's violation of

the preexisting injunction.

In 1971, petrs were

restrained and enjoined from directly or indirectly reducing, or continuing to reduce, withholding,
or continuing to withhold, the payment to AFDC
beneficiaries of any funds on the basis of credit~ng outside income of one or more members of the
family group without first determining that such
income is legally available to all members of the
family group.
Payments based on the violation of a preexisting legal duty
(the
ment.

injunction)
Edelman v.

would

not

Jordan,

contravene
415 U.S.

the

Eleventh Amend-

651 . (1974);

Hutto v.

Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
1...4--

Petrs first claim that the DC erroneously interpretA

ed the injunction to require payment regardless of a later
amendment of the Social Security Act.

.There is no mention

~~

r-:1-

--·

in the injunction that it is based on an interpretation of
the Act.

Moreover,

since

injunction as ordered it,

---

same

ju'd ge

interpreted

the

this argument is not particularly

~

strong.
court

the

This Court is now faced with a finding by the lower

that

Arguably,

the

state violated

its

preexisting

injunction.

this violation is independent of the validity of

the DC'S conclusion that the new federal law is unconstitutiona!.
Petrs next claim that the 1971 injunction was based
on an interpretation of the Social Security Act.
gres~

was

When Con-

amended the Act in 1984, petrs contend, the injunction

amended

violated

by operation of

the

injunction.

law.

The

Therefore,

problem

is

petrs

that

the

should have asked for a modification of the injunction.

never
state
In-

stead, the state went ahead and violated the injunction relying on its interpretation of a change in federal law.

One

way to analyze this problem is to read the state requirement
of

"d~termining

whether such income is legally available to

other members of the family group" as referring to a possible change

in the law.

The 1984 DEFRA amendment could be

seen to make the child support payments "legally available"
to the state.

Thus, the state did not violate the terms of

the injunction.

To adopt this interpretation of the injunc-

tion, however, the Court would have to find the DC's interpretation of

the

injunction clearly erroneous.

may hesitate to do this.

The

Court

7

r--:~-

- --

-

Another way to analyze this question is to find that
this
motion to compel adherence to the 1971 injunction.

The DC's

decision was that the new federal statute and state regulations are unconstitutional.

The DC does not have authority

on the basis for this decision to award the payment of bene fits

because

such payment would be

retroactive.

The

only

authority for ordering the payments is the preexisting injunction.

But a public right established by a court can be

--------

annulled by subs ~nt legisla 'on and should not thereafter
be er:tforced.

Hodges v.

Thus,

tantive law ena

to

the su

trump

the

determ111Cl't:1 on of

should compute AFDC benefits.
ing

principle

is

that

61

Snyder,

u.s.

600,

603

(1923).

ed by Congress would appear
the

DC as

to

how the

state

Nevertheless, a countervail-

"outstanding

injunctive

orders

of

----.

courts be obeyed until modified or reversed by a court having the authority to do so ... even though the constitutionality . of the Act under which the injunction issued is challenged, disobedience of such an outstanding order of a federal court subjects the violator to contempt even though his
constitutional claim might be later upheld."
Bd.

of

Educ.

v.

Spangler,

427

u.s.

424,

439

Pasadena City
(1976).

state in this case violated an outstanding injunction,
thus

it

appears

that

it

is

properly

subject

to

The
and

contempt.

,- Payment of all back benefits, however, appears to be a particularly severe

sanction and a· thinly disguised means

actually awarded retroactive benefits .

of

. The Court may want

~a..-~

tYf I'~
~~

to

remand

for

a determination of an

appropriate

contempt

sanction.
IV.
The

1.

Conclusion

federal

statute

is

best

read

to

preempt

state law and require that states include the child support
payments of all children in a household in the AFDC determination.
The statute does not constitute a taking of pri-

2.

vate property.

At most, the statute requires some realloca-

~f-t::L.
··~~~
. _ -~

,,

tion of family income as a condition to participating in a
federal benefit program.

volu~tary

The statute does not violate the Due Process or
,.......--the Equal Protection Clause.
The proper test is the ra3.

tiona! basis test,

and the state had a rational basis

requiring that all income of a household be considering in
calculating AFDC benefits.
4.
modif~ed

The DC's award of retroactive benefits can be

in two ways.

~

~Vt.c.- l&f1(

injunction

incorpora~ed

~.

law.

.

the Court could find that the

the possibility of a change i..t:l--1::he

Under this reading, the state did not violate the in'•

junction when it responded to the new federal statute.
reading

requires

that

the

Court

disregard

court's interpretation of the injunction.

the

This

issuing

.:::Lp<-c.
~~

~A

~~-~.

/Su.l-~
~' the Court ~ .5 ~

could find that the DC was empowered to sanction the state

~

~
~a<~
injunction which were rendered illegal by the change of fed- fv ~

for contempt, but that it could not enforce the terms of the

t-..1'/~

4~·

Jtt-W..~ ~..J.~
vu.. a....._ ~ ~,t..u-<- ~
~4.-h- c.-4_~ ~~- ~

era! law. Under this view, the case should be remanded for
a determination of the appropriate contempt sanction.

~;._
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MEMORANDUM

To:

Justice Powell

From:

April 23, 1987

Leslie

No. 86-509, Bowen v. Gilliard
The best argument

for

affirming

in this

case

(that

is,

finding the congressional statute respecting child support benefits unconstitutional)
Castillo,
the

106

burden

s.

ct.

imposed

is the Due Process Clause.
2727 (1986),

by

"heightened" scrutiny.

the

statute

should
~

be

analyzed

v.

under

found that the statu-

"directly and substantially"

fere with family living arrangements.
burden is more substantial.

~

it is difficult to argue that

The Court in

tory classification did not

After

Here,

inter-

it appears that the

Children lose significant amounts of

money by having to share it with their siblings through AFDC payments.

But it is difficult to argue that a burden imposed by a

page 2.
voluntary government aid program is "direct."
It thus appears
'
-~
~
__,.....
........__....,
that the Court should apply rational basis analysis.
This analy-

-

sis could proceed as follows:
The DC found that under state law, a child is entitled to
have child support funds spent only on him.
principle

may

be

questionable,

this

Court

lower court's interpretation of state law.
the statute at issue,

While this state law
normally

accepts

Congress, in enacting

assumed that families pool all funds,

eluding child support funds.

a

in-

Thus, Congress assumed that mothers

are routinely violating the fiduciary duty to use child support
bene~its

only for the support of the particular child.

Moreover,

this congressional classification actually encourages mothers to
violate state law.

For this reason, the classification is irra-

tional.
(Note that the other side of this issue is that the Court
could find

(as the DC did in the alternative)

statute preempts this aspect of state law.

that the

Therefore,

federal
Congress

is not forcing mothers to violate their fiduciary obligations to
the children who receive child support payments, but is redefining the law of child support.

Note also that under this view,

the Court could find that the state did

iolate the terms of

the injunction and therefore is not required to pay retroactive
benefits.

The injunction required the state to ascertain if mon-

ey was "legally available" before including it in the AFDC calculation.

If the

federal

statute· preempted this aspect of state

law, the state could reasonably have found that the child support
money was legally available.)

~lsg

04/23/87

MEMORANDUM

To:

Justice Powell

From:

April 23, 1987

Leslie

No. 86-509, Bowen v. Gilliard
In the previous memo,
the

federal

statute

Castillo, 106

s.

is

I discussed whether the burden of

"direct"

within

Ct. 2727 (1986).

the

meaning of

~

v.

The burden is not "direct" as

in Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977), where a
statute prohibited nonrelatives from living together.
no direct prohibition in this case.
'T(

-

,r

a voluntary statute.

There is

The burden is a condition to

---:::::::..

--==-- '-

It could be argued, however, that the bur-

den is more direct here than in other voluntary aid cases because
of the minor status of the

child~

He is faced with the choice of

living with his mother and siblings and sharing his

-

port, or moving ·out of the house in

orde~

child sup-

to retain the full ben-

page 2.
efit of the money.

It could be argued that the resps in

more real choice because they usually were not minors.

~

had

It could

also be argued that the relationship of mother to child is more
"fundamental" and so a burden on the relationship is less tolerable.

The

real

issue

seems to be whether Congress can make

the

legislative judgment that child support payments are being used,
and can be used,

to support an entire family as opposed to the

particular child.

If you want to find that this judgment is ir-

rational,

and burdens a child's fundamental

right to choose his

living arrangements, a reasoned opinion can be written.

~·

, ~o.

86-509

'

Bowen·. v. Gilliard
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CHAMeERS OF"

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

April 30, 1987

Re:

86-509 - Bowen v. Gilliard
86-564 - Kirk v. Gilliard

Dear Chief:
After further reflection, I have decided to vote
to reverse in these cases.
Respectfully,

·~

I
The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference
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Justice Powell
~
Justice O'Connor ~
Justice Scalia
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1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
NOS.

86-509

AND

86-564

OTIS R. BOWEN, SECRETARY OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVICES, PETITIONER
86-509
v.
BEATY MAE GILLIARD ET AL.

/LY

fY Lt

'! l v-, ~"'

fr:./
( vv

~·

DAVID T. FLAHERTY, SECRETARY, NORTH
CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN
\ BG-SS4 RESOURCES, ET ~L., APPELLANTS

Co,/ ~ '

/~

BEATY MAE GILLIARD ET AL.

ON APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
[June-, 1987]

JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.
As part of its major effort to reduce the federal deficit
through The Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, 98 Stat. 494, Congress amended the statute authorizing Federal Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) 1 to require that a
family's eligibility for benefits must take into account, with
certain specified exceptions, the income of all parents, broth1
"'The AFDC program is based on a scheme of cooperative federalism.'
King v. Smith, 392 U. S. 309, 316 (1968). Established by Title IV of the
Social Security Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 627, 'to provide financial assistance to
needy dependent children and the parents or relatives who live with and
care for them,' Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U. S. 251, 253 (1974), the federal
program reimburses each state which chooses to participate with a percentage of the funds it expends. § 403, 42 U. S. C. § 603. In return , the
State must administer its assistance program pursuant to applicable federal statutes and regulations. § 402, 42 U. S. C. § 602.'' Heckler v.
Turner, 470 U. S. 184, 189 (1985).

86-509 & 86-564-0PINION

2

BOWEN v. GILLIARD

ers and sisters living in the same home. 2 The principal
question presented in this appeal is whether that requirerrient violates the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitu Ion w en it IS app Ie to require a family wishing to
receive AF~elitS' o mclu_~~--~~Ta1hi!Q_for
whom c I1a support payments are being made by a noncusto Ial parent.
2
The Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, 98 Stat. 494, which fills over 700
pages of the statutes at large, includes two major divisions, the Tax Reform Act of 1984 and the Spending Reduction Act of 1984. The amendment at issue in this case is found in the latter division, 98 Stat. 1145. As
a result of that . amendment, § 402(a)(38) of the Social Security Act, 42
U. S. C. (Supp. III) 602(a)(38) now provides, in pertinent part:
"A State plan for aid and services to needy families with children must-

*

"'

"'

''provide that in making the determination under paragraph (7) with respect to a dependent child and applying paragraph (8), the State agency
shall (except as otherwise provided in this part) include"(A) any parent of such child, and
"(B) any brother or sister of such child, if such brother or sister meets
the conditions described in clauses (1) and (2) of section 606(a) of this title,
if such parent, brother, or sister is living in the same home as the dependent child, and any income of or available for such parent, brother, or sister
shall be included in making such determination and applying such paragraph with respect to the family (notwithstanding section 405(j) of this
title, in the case of benefits provided under subchapter II of this
chapter) .... "
Section 406(a), in turn, provides:
"The term 'dependent child' means a needy child (1) who has been deprived
of parental support or care by reason of the death, continued absence from
the home ... or physical or mental incapacity of a parent, and who is living
with his father, mother, grandfather, grandmother, brother, sister, stepfather, stepmother, stepbrother, stepsister, uncle, aunt, first cousin,
nephew, or niece, in a place of residence maintained by one or more of such
relatives as his or her own home, and (2) who is (A) under the age of eighteen, or (B) at the option of the State, under the age of nineteen and a fulltime student in a secondary school (or in the equivalent level of vocational
or technical training), if before he attains age nineteen, he may reasonably
be expected to complete the program of such secondary school (or such
training)." 42 U. S. C. § 606(a).

f-.. J
:;J
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This litigation began in 1970. At that time the federal
statute did not require that all parents and siblings be included in an AFDC filing unit. Thus, for example, if a teen- ·
age child had significant income of her own, perhaps from
wages or perhaps in support payments from an absent parent, the other members of her family could exclude her from
the filing unit in order to avoid disqualifying the entire family
from benefits or reducing its level of benefits.
Beaty Mae Gilliard, one of the named class members in the
1970 suit, 3 began receiving public assistance from North Carolina under AFDC in 1962. In February 1970, after her seventh child was born, the State automatically included him in
the filing unit, thereby increasing the family's monthly allotment from $217 to $227 to reflect the difference between the
benefit for a family of seven and the benefit for a family of
eight. Gilliard was, however, also receiving $43.33 each
month in child support from the baby's father. When a formal parental support order was entered in April 1970, the
State credited the support payments against her account and
reduced her monthly benefit to $184. Gilliard sued, contending that she had a statutory right to exclude her seventh child
from the unit and thus to continue to receive the $217 benefit
for a family of seven and also to retain the $43.33 paid by her
youngest child's father. A three-judge District Court
agreed with her reading of the statute and entered an order
requiring the State to reinstate her benefits at the $217 level
and to reimburse her for the improper credits of $43 per
month. Gilliard v. Craig, 331 F . Supp. 587 (WDNC 1971).
The District Court also granted class-wide relief. We afThe class was comprised of "persons who have been or may be subject
to reduction of AFDC . . . benefits based upon unconstitutional or illegal
claim of credit by administering agencies for outside income and other resources available to some but not all of a family group." Gilliard v. Craig,
331 F . Supp. 587, 588 (WDNC 1971).
3
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firmed that judgment. 409 U. S. 807 (1972). No constitutional question was decided at that time.
Congress amended the AFDC program in 1975 to require,
as a condition of eligibility, that applicants for assistance
must assign to the State any right to receive child support
payments for any member of the family included in the filing
unit. 4 In response, North Carolina amended its laws to provide that the acceptance of public assistance on behalf of a
dependent child would constitute an assignment of any right
to support for that child. SeeN. C. G. S. § 110-37. These
amendments, however, did not harm recipients like Gilliard
because they did not affect the right to define the family unit
covered by an application and thereby to exclude children
with independent income, such as a child for whom support
payments were being made.
In 1983, the Secretary of Health and Human Services proposed certain amendments to the Social Security Act to "assure that limited Federal and State resources are spent as
effectively as possible." Letter of 25 May 1983, to the Honorable George Bush, President of the Senate, App. 168-169
(hereinafter Heckler Letter). One of the Secretary's proposals was "to establish uniform rules on the family members
who must file together for AFDC, and the situations in which
'Section 402(a)(26)(A) provides:
"As a condition of eligibility for aid, each applicant or recipient will be
required"(A) to assign to the State any rights to support from any other person
such applicant may have (i) in his own behalf or in behalf of any other family member for whom the applicant is applying for or receiving aid, and (ii)
which have accrued at the time such assignment is executed, .... " 42
U. S. C. § 602(A)(26)(A).
The 1975 amendment also amended § 402 to require recipients to:
"cooperate with the State (i) in establishing the paternity of a child born
out of wedlock with respect to whom aid is claimed, and (ii) in obtaining
support payments for such applicant and for a child with respect to whom
such aid is claimed, or in obtaining any other other payments or property
due such applicant or such child.... " 42 U. S. C. § 602 (A)(26)(B).
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income must be counted. In general, the parents, sisters,
and brothers living together with a dependent child must all
be included; the option of excluding a sibling with income, for
example, would no longer be avai~able." Ibid. The Secretary stressed that the improvements would result in an
AFDC allocation program that "much more realistically reflects the actual home situation." Id., at 169.
The Secretary's proposal was not enacted in 1983, but one
of the provisions in the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984
(DEFRA) established a standard filing unit for the AFDC
program. The ~mee estimated that
the change would save $455,000,000 during the next three fiscal years. S. Rpt. No. 98-169, Deficit Reduction Act of
1984, Explanation of Provisions Approved by Committee on
3/21184, 980 (Comm. Print 1984) (hereinafter Senate Report).
It explained the purpose of the amendment in language that
removes any possible ambiguity in the relevant text of the
statute: 5
Present Law
"There is no requirement in present law that parents
and all siblings be included in the AFDC filing unit.
Families applying for assistance may exclude from the
filing unit certain family members who have income
which might reduce the family benefit. For example, a
family might choose to exclude a child who is receiving
Social Security payments, if the payments would reduce
• In support of the District Court's judgment, appellees have asked us to
adopt a construction of the statute that is completely inconsistent with the
intent of Congress as explained in the Secretary's request for the legislation, in the Senate Report, and in the Conference Report as well. Moreover, the arguments are inconsistent with the unambiguous regulations the
Secretary has adopted to implement the statute. See 45 CFR 206.10(a)(1)
(vii). The District Court carefully considered these statutory arguments
and rejected them. 633 F. Supp. 1529, 1548. We agree with that court's
analysis of the meaning of the statute and find no merit in appellees' statutory arguments advanced in this Court. See also Gorrie v. Bowen, 809 F.
2d 508, 513-516 (CA8 1987).
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the family's benefits by an amount greater than the
amount payable on behalf of the child.

Explanation of Provision
"The provision approved by the Committee would require States to include in the filing unit the parents and
all dependent minor siblings (except SSI recipients and
any stepbrothers and stepsisters) living with a child who
applies for or receives AFDC. * * *
"This change will end the present practice whereby
families exclude members with income in order to maximize family benefits, and will ensure that the income of
family members who live together and share expenses is
recognized and counted as available to the family as a
whole." Senate Report 980.
See also H. Conf. Rep. No. 98-861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1407
(1984).
Because the 1984 amendment forced families to include in
the~hAc!I".en or w om support payments were
being received, tliepractical effect was that many families'
total income was reduced. 6 "'rlie burden of tEe change was
mitig~y a separate amendment providing that
the first $50 of child support collected by the State must be
remitte to t e am1 y an ng__ counted as income for the purpose of determining its benefit 1evel. 7 See 42 U. S. C.
(Supp. III) § 602(a)(8)(A)(vi); 42 U. S. C. (Supp. III)
'For example, under the July 1985levels of payment in North Carolina,
a family of four with no other income would have received $269. A child's
support income of $100 would therefore reduce the family's AFDC payment to $169 if that child was included in the filing unit. The family would
have a net income of$269. But if the family were permitted to exclude the
child from the unit and only claim the somewhat smaller benefit of $246 for
a family of three, it could have collected that amount plus the excepted
child's $100 and have a net income of $346. See App. 85.
7
Therefore, under our example, n. 6, supra, the net income with the .
child included in the unit would have been $319.

86-509 & 86-564-0PINION
BOWEN v. GILLIARD

7

§ 657(b)(l).

Thus, the net effect of the 1984 Amendments for
a family comparable to Gilliard's would include three changes:
(1) the addition of the child receiving support would enlarge
the filing unit and entitle the family to a somewhat larger
benefit; (2) child support would be treated as ~mily income
and would be assigned 'to the State, thereby reaucing the
AFDC benefits by that amount; and (3) the reduction would
be offset by $50 if that amount was collected from an absent
parent. In sum, if the assigned support exceeded $50 plus
the difference in the benefit level caused by adding the child
or children receiving support, the family would suffer; if less
than $50 and the difference in the benefit level was collected
as support, it would not.
II
After North Carolina adopted regulations to comply with
the 1984 Amendments, some members of the class that had
earlier obtained relief filed a motion to reopen the 1971 decree and obtain further relief on behalf of the class. The
S~e- ~~ the Secretary of Health and Human SerVices,contending that if the State's compliance with the federal statute resulted in any liability to appellees, the Federal
Government should share in any payment of additional
AFDC benefits. The District Court found that North Carolina's and the Departmenr-or--Realth and Human Services'
regulations were in conformance with the statute, 8 but cons The Secretary of Health and Human Resources promulgated the following regulation to implement the DEFRA amendment:
"For AFDC purposes only, in order for the family to be eligible, an application with respect to a dependent child must also include, if living in the
same household and otherwise eligible for assistance:
(A) Any natural or adoptive parent, or stepparent (in the case of States
with general applicability); and
(B) Any blood-related or adoptive brother or sister." 45 CFR 206.10
(a)(l)(vii).
North Carolina's implementing regulations are set forth in the District
Court's opinion. 633 F. Supp., at 1533-1534.
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eluded that the statutory scheme violated both the Due Proc').V,jess Clause and the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 9
The court interpreted North Carolina law as imposing a
duty on the mother to use child support money exclusively
for the benefit of the child for whom it had been obtained, 10
and reasoned that a forced assignment of the support money
to the State in exchange for AFDC benefits for the entire
family was a taki _of the child's rivate ro erty. 633 F.
Supp. 1529, 1551-1555 (1986 . Additionally, the court reasoned that the use of the child's support money to reduce the
Governm~t's AFDC expenditures was tantamount to punishing fJ(the child for exercising the fundamental right to live
with his or her family. !d., at 1557. Because of the serious
impact on the autonomy of the family-including the child's
potential relationship with his or her natural father-"special f) L
~ was considered appropriate, id., at
1555-1557, and the deprivation of property and liberty
effected by the statutory scheme could not, in the court's
view, survive such scrutiny. We noted probable jurisdiction, 479 U. S . - (1986).
9
"No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use,
ithout just compensation." U. S. Const. Arndt. 5.
10
The District Court relied on the following paragraph of the opinion of
the North Carolina Supreme Court in Goodyear v. Goodyear, 257 N. C.
374, 379, 126 S. E. 2d 113, 117 (1962):
"While defendant [father] was and is obligated to make the monthly payments called for in his. contract for the support of his children, plaintiff
[mother] is not the beneficiary of the moneys which defendant must pay.
These moneys belong to the children. Plaintiff is a mere trustee for them.
That part of the payments not reasonably necessary for support and maintenance, she must hold for the benefit of the children and account to them
when they call upon her. She cannot, by contract with another person,
profit at the expense of the children."
The Goodyear opinion did not purport to announce any rule of law unique
to North Carolina; it quoted from Indiana and Iowa opinions and cited
authorities from other jurisdictions.

fJAvul1~

86-509 & 86-564-0PINION
BOWEN v. GILLIARD

9

The District Court was undoubtedly correct in its perception that a number of needy families have suffered, and will
suffer, as a resrut- or the 1mplemen ation of the DEFRA
amendments to the AFDC program. Such suffering is frequently the tragic by-product of a decision to reduce or to
modify benefits to a Class of neem reC! Ient~U nder our
structure of government, however, 1 1s the function of Congress-not the courts-to determine whether the savings realized, and presumably used for other critical governmental
..-----r functions, are significant enough to justify the costs to the in__.1 dividuals affected by such reductions.
The Fifth Amendf..
ment "gives the federal courts no power to impose upon [Con~
gress] their views of what constitutes wise economic or social
~ policy," by telling it how "to reconcile the demands of . . .
needy citizens with the finite resources available to meet
those demands." Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471,
486, 472 (1970). Unless the legislative branch's decisions run
afoul of some constitutional edict, any inequities created by
such decisions must be remedied by the democratic processes. The District Court believed that the amendments at
issue did conflict with both the Due Process Clause and the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. We consider these
arguments in turn, and reject them. 11
11
The only Court of Appeals, see Gorrie v. Brown, supra, and virtually
all o~s;-that have addressed challen es to the'inciusion of
child SUJ> Ort Or other "exclusive use"fundsli~d the validity of
these amendments, see e. g. , Showers v. Cohen, 645 F. Supp. 217 (M. D.
Pa. 1986); Sherrod v. Hegstrom, 629 F. Supp. 150 (D. Or. 1985); Huber v.
Blinzinger, 626 F. Supp. 30 (N. D. Ind. 1985); Oliver v. Ledbetter, 624 F.
Supp. 325 (N. D. Ga. 1985); Ardister v. Mansour, 627 F. Supp. 641 (W. D.
Mich. 1986) (denying preliminary injunction); Shonkwiler v. Heckler, 628
F. Supp. 1013 (S. D. Ind. 1985) (denying preliminary injunction); Cf. Park
v. Coler, 143 Ill. App. 3d 727, 493 N. E. 2d 130 (1986); but see Lesko v.
Bowen, 639 F. Supp. 1152 (ED Wis. 1986), appeal docketed, No. 86-744;
Baldwin v. Ledbetter, 647 F. Supp. 623 (N. D. Ga. 1986), appeal docketed,
No. 86-1140, stay pending appeal granted, 479 U. S. (No. A-448)
(1986) (POWELL, Circuit Justice).
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III
The precepts that govern our review of appellees' due
process and equal protection challenges to this program are
similar to those we have applied in reviewing challenges to
other parts of the Social Security Act:
"[O]ur ~tial. 'Governmental decisions
to spend money to improve the general public welfare in
one way and not another are "not confided to the courts.
The discretion belongs to Congress unless the choice is
clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary power, not an exercise of judgment."' Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U. S.
181, 185 (1976), quoting Helvering v. Davis, 301 U. S.
619, 640 (1937)." Bowen v. Owens, 476 U. S. - , - (1986).

.

This standard of review is premised on Congress' "plenary
power to define the scope and the duration of the entitlement
to . . . benefits, and to increase, to decrease, or to te·rminate
those benefits based on its appraisal of the relative importance of the recipients' needs and the resources available to
fund the program." Atkins v. Parker, 472 U. S. 115, 129
(1985); see also Schweiker v. Hogan, 457 U. S. 569 (1982);
Califano v. Boles, 443 U. S. 282, 296 (1979); California v.
Aznavorian, 439 U. S. 170 (1978); Weingberger v. Salfi, 422

u. s. 749 (1975).

The District Court had before it evidence that the DEFRA
amendments were severely impacting some families. For
example, some noncustodial parents stopped making their
support payments because they believed that their payments
were helping only the State, and not their children. 633 F.
Supp., at 1542-1543. It is clear, however, that in the administration of a fund that is large enough to have a significant impact on the Nation's deficit, general rules must be
examined in light of the broad purposes they are intended to
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serve. 12 The challenged amendment unquestionably serves
Congress' goal of decreasing federal expenditures. See Senate Report 981 (estimating that amendment in AFDC program will save $455 million during fiscal years 1984 through
1987); 130 Cong. Rec. S4099 (remarks of Sen. Dole). The evidence that a few noncustodial parents were willing to violate
the law by not making court-ordered support payments does
not alter the fact that the entire program has resulted in
saving huge sums of money.
The rationality of the amendment denying a family the J
right to exclude a supported child from the filing unit is also
supported by the Government's se arate interest in distributing bene ts among competing need fami 1es m a fair way.
Given its perceive nee o make cuts in t e AFDC udget,
Congress obviously sought to identify a group that would suffer less than others as a result of a reduction in benefits.
When considering the plight of two five-person families, one
of which receives no income at all while the other receives
regular support payments for some of the minor children, it is
surely reasonable for Congress to conclude that the former is
in greater need than the latter. This conclusion is amply
supported by Congress' assumption that child support payments received are generally beneficial to the entire family
unit, see Senate Report 980, and by "the common sense proposition that individuals living with others usually have
reduced per capita costs because many of their expenses are
shared." Termini v. Califano, 611 F. 2d 367, 370 (CA2
1979); see also Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U. S. - - , - - (1986). 13
12

"General rules are essential if a fund of this magnitude is to be administered with a modicum of efficiency, even though such rules inevitabfy
produce seemingly arbitrary consequences in some individual cases.
Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 776." California v. Jobst, 434 U. S.
47, 53 (1977).
13
An assumption that child support payments to families receiving
AFDC benefits are typically used for the entire family's needs is entirely
reasonable. See Senate Report, supra, at 980 (amendment will "ensure
that the income of family members who live together and share expenses is
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It was therefore rational for Congress to adjust the AFDC
program to re ect e fact t at support money genera y providesslgru can ene ts or en Ire ami y um s.
Is conclusionisno un ermine by the act at ere are no doubt
many families in which some-or perhaps all-of the support
money is spent in a way that does not benefit the rest of the
family. In determining how best to allocate limited funds
among the extremely large class of needy families eligible for
AFDC benefits, Congress is entitled to rely on a class-wide
presumption that custodial parents have used, and may
legitimately use, support funds in a way that is beneficial to
entire family units. As we have repeatedly explained:
If the classification has some 'reasonable basis,' it does
not offend the Constitution simply because the classification 'is not made with mathematical nicety or because it
results in some inequality.' Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61, 78. 'The problems of government are practical ones and may justify, if they do
not require, rough accomodations-illogical, it may be,
and unscientific.' Metropolis Theatre Co. v. City of Chicago, 228 U. S. 61, 69-70. "A. statutory discrimination
recognized"). This conclusion does not rest on an assumption that custodial parents routinely violate State law restrictions on the use of support
money. For the requirement that the support income be used for the
"benefit" of the child does not preclude its use for common expenses.
Moreover, the custodial parent's duty to benefit the supported child is not
necessarily served simply by spending more money on him or her than on
other children living in the same home. As the District Court recognized,
nothing in North Carolina law requires a custodial parent to focus only on
the economic interest of the child receiving support without taking into account the emotional and psychological welfare of the child. Congress' finding that custodial parents were routinely using the support funds for the
entire family thus reflects the reality that such use is typically proper since
expenditures for an entire family unit typically benefit each member of the
household. We do not question Congress' reliance on the Secretary of
Health and Human Services' assurance that counting child support income
as part of the family income "much more realistically reflects the actual
home situation." Heckler Letter, App. 168-169.
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will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may
be conceived to justify it.' McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U. S. 420, 426." Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471,
485 (1970).
See also Weinberger v. Salfi, supra, at 785. We have no
doubt that the DEFRA amendment satisfies this test. 14
Appellees argue (and the District Court ruled), however,
that finding that Congress acted rationally is not enough to
sustain this legislation. Rather, they claim that some form
of "heightened scrutiny" is appropriate because the amendment interferes with a family's fundamental right to live in
the type of family unit it chooses. 15 We conclude that the
District Court erred in subjecting the DEFRA amendment to
any form of heightened scrutiny. That some families may
decide to modify their living arrangements in order to avoid
the effect of the amendment, does not transform the amendment into an act whose design and direct effect is to "intrude[] on choices concerning family living arrangements."
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494, 499 (1977).
As was the case with the marriage-related provision upheld
in Califano v. Jobst, 434 U. S. 47 (1978), "Congress adopted
the rule in the course of constructing a complex social welfare
14
Congress' presumption is similar to the one made in § 402(a)(31), 42
U. S. C. § 602(a)(31), which provides that portions of a stepparent's income
are to be considered as part of the family income for AFDC purposes. In
Brown v. Heckler, 589 F. Supp. 985 (ED Pa.), affirmed, 760 F. 2d 255
(CA3 1984), the court explained that the presumption that a stepparent
will assist in supporting his or her spouse's children is rational, even
though stepparents are under no legal duty to assist the children, and not
every stepparent does. See also Kollett v. Harris, 619 F. 2d 134 (CAl
1980) (holding that inclusion of stepparent's income as available to child in
the Supplemental Security Income program was not unconstitutionally
irrational).
15
For example, the District Court had before it an affidavit from one
mother who stated that she had sent a child to live with the child's father in
order to avoid the requirement of including that child, and the support
received from the child's father, in the AFDC unit. 633 F. Supp., at
1537-1538.
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system that necessarily deals with the intimacies of life.
This is not a case where the Government seeks to foist orthodoxy on the unwilling." !d., at 53, n. 11.
Last Term we rejected a constitutional challenge to a
provision in the Federal Food Stamp Program, which determines eligibility and benefit levels on a "household" rather
than an individual basis. Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U. S. - (1986). 16 We held that the ~of equal treatment in
the due process Clause of the Fifth Amendment was not violated by the statutory requirement that generally treated
parents, children, and siblings who lived together as a single
household, and explained:
"The disadvantaged class is that comprised by parents,
children, and siblings. Close relatives are not a 'suspect' or 'quasi-suspect' class. As a historical matter,
they have not been subjected to discrimination; they do
not exhibit obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics that define them as a discrete group; and they
are not a minority or politically powerless. See, e. g.,
Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427
U. .S. 307, 313-314 (1976) (per curiam). In fact, quite
the contrary is true.
"Nor does the statutory classification 'directly and
substantially' interfere with family living arrangements
and thereby burden a fundamental right. Zablocki v.
Redhail, 434 U. S. 374, 386-387, and n.12 (1978). See
id., at 403-404 (STEVENS, J., concurring); Califano v.
Jobst, 434 U. S. 47, 58 (1977)." 477 U. S., a t - .
~

In light of this, we concluded in Lyng that the "District Court
erred in judging the constitutionality of the statutory distinction under 'heightened scrutiny.'" I d., at - - . In this case
the District Court committed the same error. As in Lyng,
18

The District Court denied appellants' motion for reconsideration in
light of our decision in Lyng. App. to Juris. Statement in No. 86-509,
107a.
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the standard of review here is whether "Congress had a rational basis" for its decision. I d., at - - . And as in Lyng,
"the justification for the statutory classification is obvious."
I d., at - - . The provisions at issue do not violate the Due
Process Clause. 17
IV
Aside from holding that the amendment violated the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and its equal protection component, The District Court invalidated t~ QEFRA
amendment as a taking of private P!~~ty without just compensat~msliOiamg on the premise that
a child for whom support payments are made has a right to
have the support money used exclusively in his or her "best
interest." Yet, the court reasoned, the requirements (1)
that a custodial parent who applies for AFDC must include a
child's support money in computing family income, and (2)
that the support must be assigned to the State, effectively
converts the support funds that were once to be used exclusively for the child's best interests into an AFDC check
which, under federal law, must be used for the benefit of all
the children. §405, 42 U.S. C. §605. Therefore, the Dis17

Nor is there any merit in the contention that the assignment provision,
see supra, at 4, and n. 4, violates the Due Process Clause. Once it is determined that it is permissible to include all members of the family in the
unit, the assignment of the benefits typically has no adverse effect on the
child receiving support. To the contrary, through the assignment provision the Government takes over the responsibility of making sure that
noncustodial parents actually perform their child support obligations. The
State also bears the risk of non-payment of support, since the family
receives the identical amount of AFDC (although not the $50 supplement)
whether or not the absent parent makes payments. In the first ten years
following the adoption of the assignment requirement in 1975, legal paternity was established for more than 1.5 million children, more than 3.5 million support orders were established, and $6.8 billion in support obligations
was collected on behalf of children in AFDC families. Office of Child Support Enforcement, U. S. Dep't of Health & Human Services, A Decade of
Child Support Enforcement 1975-1985: Tenth Annual Report to Congress
for the Period Ending September 30, 1985, at iii, 6, 9-10 (1985).
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trict Court held that the state was "taking" that child's right
to exclusive use of the support mon~ In addressing this
issue, it is helpful to look first at whether the state "takes"
the child's property when it considers the support payments
as part of the family's income in computing AFDC eligibility.
We will then consider whether the requirement that support
payments be assigned to the State requires a finding that the
amendments violate the taking prohibition.
Some perspective on the issue is helpful here. Had no
AFDC program ever existed until 1984, and had Congress
then instituted a program that took into account support payments that a family receives, it is hard to believe that we
would seriously entertain an argument that the new benefit
program constituted a taking. Yet, somehow, once benefits
are in place and Congress sees a need to reduce them in order
to save money and to distribute limited resources more
fairly, the "takings:_ label seems to have a bit more plausibility. For legal purposes t~s are identicat" See Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Social Security Entrapment, 477 U. S. - - (1986). Congress is not,
by virtue of having instituted a social welfare program,
bound to continue it at all, much less at the same benefit
level. Thus, notwithstanding the technical legal arguments
that have been advanced, it is imperative to recognize that
the amendment at issue merely incorporates a definitional
element into an entitlement program. It would be quite
strange indeed if, by virtue of an offer to provide benefits to
needy families through the entirely voluntary AFDC program, Congress or the States were deemed to have taken
some of those very family members' property.
The basic requirement that the AFDC filing unit must include all family members living in the home, and therefore
that support payments made on behalf of a member of the
family must be considered in determining that family's level
of benefits, does not even arguably take anyone's property.
The family members other than the child for whom the sup-
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port is being paid certainly have no taking claim, since it is
clear that they have no protected property rights to continued benefits at the same level. · See Public Agencies Opposed to Social Security Entrapment, supra. Nor does the
simple inclusion of the support income in the benefit calculation have any legal effect on the child's right to have it used
for his or her benefit. To the extent that a child has the
right to have the support payments used in his "best interest," he or she fully retains that right. Of course, the effect
of counting the support payments as part of the filing unit's
income often reduces the family's resources, and hence increases the chances that sharing of the support money will be
appropriate. See n. 13, supra. But given the unquestioned
premise that the government has a right to reduce AFDC
benefits generally, that result does not constitute a taking of
private property without just compensation.
The only possible legal basis for appellees' takings claim,
therefo~ that an applicant for AFDC
benefits must assign the support payments to the State,
which then will remit the amount collected to the custodial
parent to be used for the benefit of the entire family. This
legal transformation in the status of the funds, the argument
goes, modifies the the child's interest in the use of the money
so dramatically that it constitutes a taking of the child's property. As a practical matter, this argument places form over
substance, and labels over reality. Although it is true that
money which was earmarked for a specific child's or children's "best interest" becomes a part of a larger fund available for all of the children, the difference between these
concepts is, as we have discussed, more theoretical than
practical. 18
18

In analyzing the effect of the assignment it is again instructive to ask
what would happen to the support payments if there were no AFDC program at all. In that case, it would appear that custodial parents would
have to use a much greater portion of the support payments to sustain the
family unit, since it could hardly be deemed in the child's best interest for
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In evaluating whether governmental regulation of property constitutes a "taking" we have "eschewed the development of any set formula ... and have relied instead on ad
hoc, factual inquiries into the circumstances of each particular case." Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 475
u. s. 211,- (1986).
To aid in this determination, however, we have identified three factors which have 'particular significance:' (1)
'the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant';
(2) 'the extent to which the regulation has interfered
with distinct investment-backed expectations'; and (3)
'the character of the governmental action.' Penn Central Transportation Co., [438 U. S. 104,] 124." Connolly, supra, at--.
Here, each of these three factors refutes the conclusion that
th~s been a taking.
~in evaluating the

=-

economic impact of the assignment,
it is Important to remember that it is the impact on the child,
not on the entire family unit, that is relevant. Thus, the fact
that the entire family's net income may be reduced does not
necessarily mean that the amount of money spent for the benefit of a supported child will be any less than the amount of
the noncustodial parent's support payments. The reality is
that the money will usually continue to be used in the same
manner that it was previously since the typical AFDC parent
will have used the support money as part of the general family fund even without its being transferred through AFDC.
Seen. 13, supra. Moreover, any diminution in the value of
the support payments for the child is mitigated by the extr_a
his custodial parent and siblings to have no funds whatsoever. The overall
practical effect of the AFDC program (even after the 1984 amendment),
therefore, is to enhance the probability that a child whose custodial parent
is receiving support payments in the child's behalf will obtain direct economic benefit from those funds, in addition to the benefits that result from
preserving the family unit. A reduction in that enhancement is no more a
taking than any other reduction in a Social Security program.
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$50 that the family r~ceives as a result of the assignment, by
the extra AFDC benefits that are received by the inclusion of
an additional family member in the unit, and by the fact that
the State is using its own enforcement power to collect the
support payments, and is bearing the risk of nonpayment in
any given month. Whatever the diminution in value of the
child's right to have support funds used for his or her "exclusive" benefit may be, it is not so substantial as to constitute a taking under our precedents. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U. S. - - , - (1987); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U. S. 255, 260 (1980);
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438
U. S~J , 131 (1978).
Secon , the child receiving support payments holds no
C.._rest protectable expectation that his or her parent will
continue to receive identical support payments on the child's
behalf, and that the child will enjoy the same rights with respect to them. See Layton v. Layton, 263 N. C. 453, 456,
139 S. E. 2d 732, 734 (1965) (support is "not a property right
of the child"). The prospective right to support payments,
and the child's expectations with respect to the use of such
funds, are clearly subject to modification by law, be it
through judicial decree, state legislation, or Congressional
enactments. See N. C. G. S. § 50-13.7 (modification of
order for child support). For example, one of the chief criteria in assessing a child-support obligation is the noncustodial
parent's ability to make payments, see Coggins v. Coggins,
260 N. C. 765, 133 S. E. 2d 700 (1963); Douglas, Factors in
Determining Child Support, 36 Juvenile and Family Court
Journal27 (1985), and an adverse change in that parent's ability may, of course, require a modification of the decree. 2 J.
Atkinson, Modern Child Custody Practice § 10.25, p. 527-528
(1986) (discussing reductions in support). Any right to have
the state force a noncustodial parent to make payments is,
like so many other legal rights (including AFDC payments
themselves), subject to modification by "the public acts of
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government." Reichelderfer v. Quinn, 287 U. S. 315, 319
(1933); see generally Public Agencies Opposed to Social Security Entrapment, supra, at--. As the District Court explained, Congress, and the States, through their implementing statutes and regulations, have modified those rights
through passage of (and the States' compliance with) the
DEFRA amendments. See 633 F. Supp., at 1548-1551;
Gorrie v. Bowen, 809 F. 2d 508, 521 (CAS 1987). This prospective change in the child's expectations concerning future
use of ~pport payments is far from anything we have ever
deemed 4 taking.
r . Finallyi the character of the governmental action here mili\~.t~t~~ga:inst a finding that the States or Federal Government unconstitutionally take property through the AFDC
program. It is obviously necessary for the government to
make hard choices and to balance various incentives in deciding how to allocate benefits in this type of program. But a
decision to include child support as part of the family income
certainly does not implicate the type of concerns that the
takings clause protects. This is by no means an enactment
that forces "some people alone to bear burdens which, in all
fairness, should be borne by the public as a whole." Armstrong v. United States, 364 U. S. 40, 49 (1960).
The law does not require any custodial parent to ap ly for
AFDC benefits.
ure y 1t 1 r asonable to presume that a
parent who aoes make such an application does so because
she or he is convinced that the family as a whole-as well as
each child committed to her or his custody-will be better off
with the benefits than without. In making such a decision,
the parent is not taking a child's property without just compensation; nor is the State doing so when it responds to that
decision by supplementing the collections of support money
with additional AFDC benefits.

v
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Stewart described
the courts' role in cases such as this:
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"We do not decide today that the ... regulation is wise,
that it best fulfills the relevant social and economic objectives that [Congress] might ideally espouse, or that a
more humane system could not be devised. Conflicting
claims of morality and intelligence are raised by opponents and proponents of almost every measure, certainly
including the one before us. But the intractable economic, social, and even philosophical problems presented
by public welfare assistance programs are not the business of the Court. The Constitution may impose certain
procedural safeguards upon systems of welfare administration, Goldberg v. Kelly, ante, p. 254. But the Constitution does not empower this Court to second-guess
. . . officials charged with the difficult responsibility of
allocating limited public welfare funds among the myriad
of potential recipients." Dandridge v. Williams, supra,
at 487.
The judgment of the District Court is
Reversed.
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dissenting.
Government in the modern age has assumed increasing responsibility for the welfare of its citizens. This expansion of
responsibility has been accompanied by an increase in the
scale and complexity of the activities that Government conducts. Respect for the enormity of the administrative task
that confronts the modern welfare state, as well as for the
scarcity of Government resources, counsels that public officials must enjoy considerable discretion in determining the
most effective means of fulfilling their responsibilities~ 1
The very pervasiveness of modern Government, however,
creates an unparalleled opportunity for intrusion on personal
JUSTICE BRENNAN,

As we have said with respect to the Social Security program, for instance, "[g]eneral rules are essential if a fund of this magnitude is to be
administered with a modicum of efficiency, even though such rules inevitably produce seemingly arbitrary consequences in some individual cases."
Califano v. Jobst, 434 U. S. 47, 53 (1977).
1

J

'
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life. In a society in which most persons receive some form of
Government benefit, Government has considerable leverage
in shaping individual behavior. In most cases, we acknowledge that Government may wield its power even when its actions likely influence choices involving personal behavior.
On rare occasions, however, Government intrusion into private life is so direct and substantial that we must deem it intolerable if we are to be true to our belief that there is a
boundary between the public citizen and the private person.
This is such a case. The Government has told a child who
lives with a mother receiving public assistance that it cannot
both live with its mother and be supported by its father.
The child must either leave the care and custody of the
mother, or forgo the support of the father and become a Government client. The child is put to this choice not because it
seeks Government benefits for itself, but because of a fact
over which it has no control: the need of other household
members for public assistance. A child who lives with one
parent has, under the best of circumstances, a diffic.ult time
sustaining a relationship with both its parents. A crucial
bond between a child and its parent outside the home, usually
the father, is the father's commitment to care for the material
needs of the child, and the expectation of the child that it may
look to its father for such care. The Government has thus
decreed that a condition of welfare eligibility for a mother
is that her child surrender a vital connection with either the
father or the mother.
The Court holds that the Government need only show a rational basis for such action. This standard of review has regularly been used in evaluating the claims of applicants for
Government benefits, since "a noncontractual claim to receive funds from the public treasury enjoys no constitutionally protected status." Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749,
772 (1975). Plaintiff child support recipients in this case,
however, are children who wish not to receive public assistance, but to continue to be supported by their noncustodial
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parent. Their claim is not that the Government has unfairly
denied them benefits, but that it has intruded deeply into
their relationship with their parents. More than a mere rational basis is required to withstand this challenge, and, as
the following analysis shows, the Government can offer no
adequate justification for doing such damage to the parentchild relationship.
I
A

The family is an institution "deeply rooted in this Nation's
history and tradition." Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431
U. S. 494, 503 (1977). Our society's special solicitude for
the family reflects awareness that "[i]t is through the family
that we inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished
values, moral and cultural." I d., at 503-504 (footnote omitted). 2 As a result, we have long recognized that "freedom
of personal choice in matters of family life is a fundamental
liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment."
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U. S. 745, 753 (1982). See also
Cleveland Board of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U. S. 632, 639
(1974). Therefore, "when the government intrudes on
choices concerning family living arrangements, this Court
must examine carefully the importance of governmental interests advanced and the extent to which they are served by
the challenged regulation." Moore, supra, at 499. 3
A fundamental element of family life is the relationship
between parent and child. As we said in Lehr v. Robertson,
2
See also Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and
Reform (OFFER), 431 U. S. 816, 844 (1977) (importance of the family
"stems from the emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of
daily association, and from the role it plays in 'promoting a way of life'
through the instruction of children, as well as from the fact of blood relationship") (citation omitted).
3
See also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479, 503 (1965) ("there is a
'realm of family life that the state cannot enter' without substantial justification") (WHITE, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
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463 U. S. 248, 256 (1983), "[t]he intangible fibers that connect
parent and child have infinite variety. They are woven
throughout the fabric of our society, providing it with
strength, beauty, and flexibility. It is self-evident that they
are sufficiently vital to merit constitutional protection in appropriate cases." We have thus been vigilant in ensuring
that Government does not burden the ability of parent and
child to sustain their vital connection. See, e. g., Santosky,
supra, at 753; Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U. S. 645 (1972); Meyer
v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923). 4
"[T]he rights of the parents are a counterpart of the responsibilities they have assumed." Lehr, supra, at 257.
When parents make a commitment to meet those responsibilities, the child has a right to rely on the unique contribution
of each parent to material and emotional support. The child
therefore has a fundamental interest in the continuation of
parental care and support, and a right to be free of governmental action that would jeopardize it. As the next section
discusses, a child in modern society faces perhaps more difficulty than ever before in sustaining a relationship with both
parents.
B
It is increasingly the case that a child in contemporary
America lives in a household in which only one parent is
present. The percentage of households headed by one parent has doubled since 1970, from 13% to 26%. U. S. Dept. of
Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Household and Family Characteristics: March 198~ 1
'We have not hesitated to protect this relationship even when it has
existed outside the traditional family arrangement. See, e. g., Caban v.
Mohammed, 441 U. S. 380 (1979) (recognizing parental interest of unwed
father who had participated in raising his children); Smith, supra, at
846-847 (acknowledging fundamental liberty interest of parents whose
child had been placed in temporary foster care). These cases reflect
appreciation of the fact that the parent-child bond is a fundamental relationship that requires protection regardless, and perhaps especially because, of the misfortune and caprice that inevitably beset human affairs.
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(1985) (Current Population Reports). 5 Researchers predict
that "close to half of all children living in the United States
today will reach age 18 without having lived continuously
with both biological parents." Furstenberg, Nord, Peterson, & Zill, The Life Course of Children of Divorce: Marital
Disruption and Parental Contact, 48 Am. Soc. Rev. 656
(1983).
Almost 90% of single-parent households are headed by
women, 6 and a considerable percentage of them face great
financial difficulty. One prominent reason is that divorce
"produces a precipitous decline in women's household incomes." Weiss, The Impact of Marital Dissolution on Income and Consumption in Single-Parent Households, 46 J.
Marriage & Fam. 115, 115 (1984). 7 In 1977, one-half of all
related children under age 18 in female-headed households
were below the poverty level. Espenshade, The Economic
Consequences of Divorce, 41 J. Marriage & Fam. 615, 616
(1979). Not surprisingly, many such households must rely
on public assistance. 8
5
Almost 60% of all black families with children are headed by one parent, compared with only 36% in 1970. While only one in ten white families
were headed by a single parent in 1970, the figure is now one in five.
U. S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Household and Family Characteristics: March 1984 5 (1985).
6
Families headed by women accounted for 25% of the households added
from 1980 to 1984, compared to 18% of the households added from 1970 to
1980. Current Population Reports, at 2. See also H. Ross & I. Sawhill,
Time of Transition: The Growth of Families Headed by Women (1975). 7
One scholar has found that "when income is compared to needs, divorced men experience an average 42 percent rise in their standard of living in the first year after the divorce, while divorced women (and their
children) experience a 73 percent decline." L. Weitzman, The Divorce
Revolution 323 (1985).
8
In May of 1982, of all AFDC families, only 9.4% had a father present in
the home. U. S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, Findings of the
May 1981-May 1982 Aid to Families With Dependent Children Study 3
(1985).
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Increasing numbers of children in this country thus reside
only with their mother, in a household whose financial condition is precarious. These children have a fundamental interest in sustaining a relationship with their mother, since she is
their primary source of daily emotional support. They also
have a fundamental interest, of course, in sustaining a relationship with their father, whose absence from the household
does not diminish the protection that must be afforded this
parent-child relationship. The need for connection with the
father is underscored by considerable scholarly research,
which indicates that "[t]he optimal situation for the child is
to have both an involved mother and an involved father."
H. Biller, Paternal Deprivation 10 (1974). 9 Research indicates that maintenance of a relationship with both parents is
particularly important for children whose parents have divorced: "By his or her presence or absence, the visiting parent remains central to the psychic functioning of the children." Wallerstein & Kelly, The Father-Child Relationship:
Changes After Divorce, in The Father: Developmental and
Clinical Perspectives 451, 454 (8. Cath, A. Gurwitt, and J.
Ross, eds. 1982). 10
In short, "training, nurture, and loving protection ... are
at the heart of the parental relationship protected by the
Constitution," Rivera v. Minnich, - - U. S. - - , - (1987), and a child's relationship with a father outside the
home can be an important source of these benefits.
9
"[P]aternal deprivation, including patterns of inadequate fathering as
well as father absence, is a highly significant factor in the development-of
serious psychological and social problems." I d., at 1. See also Hetherington & Deur, The Effects of Father Absence on Child Development, 26
Young Children 233, 244 (1971) ("Father absence appears to be associated
with a wide range of disruptions in social and cognitive development in
children").
10
See also Hetherington, Divorce: A Child's Perspective, 34 American
Psychologist 851, 856 (1979) ("Most children wish to maintain contact with
the father, and in preschool children, mourning for the father and fantasies
of reconciliation may continue for several years").
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c
The Government's insistence that a child living with an
AFDC mother relinquish its child support deeply intrudes on
the father-child relationship, for child support is a crucial
means of sustaining the bond between a child and its father
outside the home. A father's support represents a way in
which the father can make an important contribution to raising the child, and the benefits to the child are both financial
and emotional.
Financially, child support makes available resources to
help meet the child's daily material needs-resources especially important because of the financial difficulties that confront many households headed by women. Child support is
also integrally related to the father's ongoing involvement in
raising the child. The father is not there on a daily basis
to wake the child in the morning, bring him or her to school,
answer innumerable questions, offer guidance with personal
problems, put the child to bed, and provide the countless
doses of encouragement and consolation that daily life requires. Nonetheless, by helping to meet the child's daily
material needs, the father can let the child know that the
father is committed to participating in the child's upbringing.
Meals, clothes, toys, and other things made possible by this
support represent this commitment even when the father
cannot be there to affirm it himself. 11
The provision of support by a father outside the home
therefore constitutes a parent-child relationship founded
upon the pledge of the father to provide support that is responsive to the particular needs of the unique child that is the
"Studies of children of divorce, for instance, indicate that "children who
were well-supported were significantly less likely to feel rejected by their
father." Wallerstein & Huntington, Bread and Roses: Nonfinancial Issues
Related to Fathers' Economic Support of Children Following Divorce, in
The Parental Child-Support Obligation 135, 149 (J. Cassetty ed.) (1983).
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father's own. 12 Braces, special shoes, lessons-a father may
not be able to provide all these things for his child, but he is
entitled to try. The father may not be the custodial parent,
available on a daily basis. Nonetheless, he is the child's father, and "[t]he significance of the biological relationship is
that it offers the natural father an opportunity that no other
male possesses to develop a relationship with his offspring.
If he grasps that opportunity and accepts some measure of
responsibility for the child's future, he may enjoy the blessings of the parent-child relationship and make uniquely valuable contributions to the child's development." Lehr, supra,
463 U. S., at 262.
The role of child support in providing a "critical bond" between father and child, Brief for Juvenile and Family Court
Judges as Amicus Curiae 23, is documented in studies on
divorced families. "[C]hild support is unquestionably one
of the major strands in the relationship between fathers and
children in the years following divorce." Wallerstein & Huntington, Bread and Roses: Nonfinancial Issues Related to Fathers' Economic Support of Children Following Divorce, in
The Parental Child-Support Obligation 135, 135 (J. Cassetty
ed. 1983). As one national study concluded:
"The performance of the parental role, especially for
males, is linked to the ability to provide material support
for the child following marital dissolution. It has been
suggested that lower-status males withdraw from the
paternal role when they cannot contribute materially to
the welfare of the child. [This study provides] evidence
12
Guidelines for those support obligations that are judicially-imposed,
for instance, require consideration of the needs of the particular child in
question. See, e. g., Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, 9A U. L. A.
§ 309 (1979 & 1987 Supp.) (court must consider, inter alia, "the physical
and emotional condition of the child and his educational needs"). See also
Douglas, Factors in Determining Child Support, 36 Juvenile & Fam. Court
J. 27 (Fall 1985).
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that fathers who pay some support are much more likely
to see their children on a regular basis." Furstenberg,
et al., supra, at 665. 13
Thus, aside from its intrinsic importance, child support is a
strand tightly interwoven with other forms of connection between father and child. Removal of this strand can unravel
all the others.
Through child support, then, children in the increasing
number of one-parent families in this country have a means of
sustaining a relationship with both parents. The bond with
the custodial parent, usually the mother, is forged through
daily contact and care. The bond with the parent outside the
home, usually the father, is maintained to a significant degree through provision for the child's material needs. In
these ways, the family sustains the involvement of both parents in the upbringing of the child as best as the fragmentation of their lives will permit.
Such an arrangement is a hard-won accomplishment, for,
sadly, the stresses of separation often result in the effective
disintegration of the relationship of the child with the parent
outside the home. 14 Many children report only infrequent
visits from their fathers, and a large number do not receive
3

If this is the case for the father-child relationship formed after divorce,
it is even more true for those relationships out of wedlock. Father and
child in those instances do not, as do families of divorce, have available a
fund of prior daily association on which to draw in sustaining a parent-child
bond.
"For children of divorce, for instance, "[m]arital disruption effectively
destroys the ongoing relationship between children and the biological parent living outside the home in a majority of families." Furstenberg &
Nord, Parenting Apart: Patterns ofChildrearing After Marital Disruption,
47 J. Marriage & Fam. 893, 902 (1985). In one study, for instance, children with a father outside the home were asked, "When you think about
your family, who specifically do you include?" Virtually all children included the biological parent with whom they were residing, and 72% mentioned their stepfather. Dishearteningly, however, only half the children
included their biological father as a member of their family. /d ., at 899.
'
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the child support payments to which they are entitled. 15 The
father outside the home and his child who sustain a relationship therefore may claim a rare and fragile achievement, for
"outside parents who are committed to maintaining a relationship are a special breed and their children recognize it."
Furstenberg & Nord, supra, at 903.
II

The first part of this section describes the infringement on
the parent-child relationship produced by the household filing
requirement. The second part demonstrates that the claim
presented in this case differs from the unsuccessful challenges to benefit programs that the Court relies upon to uphold the filing provision.
A
If a child is living with its mother and receiving support
from its father, it is clear that the Government could not
terminate either of these relationships without substantial
justification. It could not remove the child from the custody
of the mother without a compelling reason, and would have to
prove its case by clear and convincing evidence to do so.
Santosky v. Kramer, supra. The argument that other connections might remain would be unavailing, for the custodial
relationship is a vital bond between mother and child.
Nor could the Government forbid the father from supporting his child without some powerful justification. A father is
entitled to support his child, and the child is entitled to look
to the father for this support. To prohibit paternal support
would deny the father a crucial means of participating in the
upbringing of the child, and deny the child its entitlement to
15
"Despite court orders, noncustodial fathers fail to pay $4 billion in child
support each year. More than half (53%) of the millions of women who are
due child support do not receive the court-ordered support." L. Weitzman, supra, at 262 (footnote omitted). See also D. Chambers, Making
Fathers Pay (1979); Hetherington, Cox, & Cox, The Aftermath of Divorce,
in Mother/Child Father/Child Relationships 149, 163 (J. Stevens & M.
Mathews, eds.) (1978).
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receive support from a biological parent who has a deeprooted interest in seeing that the particular needs of that
child are met. The argument that other forms of connection
might remain likewise would be unavailing, for a father's support of his own child is integral to sustaining the parent-child
relationship.
The intrusion on the fundamental interest in family life in
each of these scenarios should be apparent to us all. Yet the
Government in this case has used its economic leverage to
achieve exactly the same result. It has told children who
live with mothers who need AFDC that they cannot both live
with their mothers and receive child support from their fathers. Rather than terminate either relationship itself, the
Government requires the child to choose between them. It
has declared that, for an indigent mother with a child receiving child support, a condition of her AFDC eligibility is that
her child relinquish its fundamental constitutional interest in
maintaining a vital bond with either her or the child's father.
On the one hand, if the child stays with its mother, the father is told that henceforth the Government, not he, will support the child. Unless he is wealthy enough to support the
entire household, all but $50 of any support payment that the
father makes will be used to reimburse the Government for
making a welfare payment for use by the whole family. This
conversion of the father's support payment into Government
reimbursement means that the father is rendered powerless
in most cases to respond to the special financial needs of his
child.
It is important to illustrate why this is the case. Let us
suppose that a couple with one child obtains a divorce, that
the mother has a child by a previous marriage, and that the
mother has custody of the two children. The mother has no
source of income, but the father from whom she obtained her
recent divorce provides $150 a month to support his child. If
the mother desires to keep both her children, the $150 in ·
child support must be assigned to the State. In return, the

86-509 & 86-564-DISSENT ·
12

BOWEN v. GILLIARD

three-person household receives, let us say, $400 a month in
AFDC. Of the $150 in child support assigned to the State,
$50 is returned for use of the child for whom it was paid, and
$100 is kept by the State as reimbursement for its welfare
payment.
If the father wanted to increase the amount of child support, say to $200, because of the child's special needs, none of
the extra money would go to the child. The family would still
receive $400 in AFDC, and the child would still receive $50 of
the support payment. The only difference would be that the
State would now get to keep $150 as reimbursement for the
welfare payment. By continuing to live with the mother,
the child has lost not only the financial benefit of the father's
support, but a father-child relationship founded on the father's commitment to care for the material needs of his child.
If the child has a conscientious father who has shouldered his
paternal duty, that father will be enlisted to help defray the
cost of providing for other children whose fathers are not so
responsible. A child thus must pay a high price for continuing to live with its mother.
This price is not merely speculative. The affidavits in this
case establish it. Diane Thomas, for instance, has two children, Crystal, age 9, and Sherrod, age 7. Appendix to Jurisdictional Statement (App.) 22a. Although she has sought
gainful employment, she has been unable to find work.
Crystal's father has almost never complied with a court order
requiring him to contribute to Crystal's support. Sherrod's
father, however, has voluntarily paid $200 a month on a regular basis toward Sherrod's support. Prior to October 1984,
Ms. Thomas received $194 a month in AFDC for the support
of herself and Crystal. In October, she received a notice
that if she did not file an AFDC application for Sherrod and
assign his child support to the State her assistance would be
terminated. She then applied for benefits for herself and
both her children, assigning Sherrod's child support rights to
the State. Because the child support is now regarded as the
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income of the whole household, the AFDC grant has been reduced to $73 a month. Whereas Sherrod formerly had been
entitled to $200 a month in support, he is now entitled to onethird of the $273 total income attributed to the household, or
$91, and to $50 of his father's monthly support check assigned
to the State, for a total of $141. The financial cost to
Sherrod of staying with his mother is thus $59 a month.
Sherrod has paid an emotional price for continuing to live
with his mother as well. Two months after the household
began receiving welfare, Sherrod's father began to withhold
support payments. Ms. Thomas stated, "He informed me
that as long as I was going to use Sherrod's support money to
support Crystal, he would continue to withhold the support."
I d., at 25a. Furthermore, he has not visited Sherrod since
beginning to withhold support payments. As Ms. Thomas
stated, "[Sherrod's father] is extremely opposed to his son
being on welfare benefits, and has told me that he stopped
seeing his son because I now receive AFDC for Sherrod."
ld., at 26a. Sherrod, of course, has no control over any of
this, but nonetheless must suffer the loss of his father's care:
"Sherrod is very upset that his father no longer visits
him. He frequently asks me why his daddy does not
come to see him anymore. Since the time his father has
stopped visitation, Sherrod has begun to wet his bed on
a frequent basis. Also since the visitation stopped,
Sherrod has become much more disruptive, especially in
school. Furthermore, his performance in school seems
to have declined." ld., at 26a-27a. 16
The testimony at trial in this case sheds some light on the
reactions of fathers such as Sherrod's. Professor Stack of
Duke University testified:
16

While Sherrod's father may be criticized, he is under no judiciallyimposed obligation to pay support. The record thus contains more than
mere "evidence that a few noncustodial parents were willing to violate the
law by not making court-ordered support payments." Ante, a t - .
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"A law that tells fathers that their efforts cannot keep
their children off the welfare rolls, or that what they
can provide is not good enough, challenges the efforts
and integrity of good men and fathers. Feelings of anger, frustration, and shame are not inappropriate or
unexpected. The anger is sometimes vented at children, sometimes at mothers, more often both." I d., at
82a-83a.
North Carolina District Judge Hunt also testified about her
experience in dealing with fathers who have an obligation to
provide child support:
"Many of these fathers grew up on welfare and they are
very sensitive to ... the lack of a father involved in their
lives. They know and understand the pride the child
feels when he or she can say 'my daddy supports me.'
These fathers know firsthand that the children will grow
up knowing that they are on welfare and that their mothers depend for support on a check each month from the
Department of Human Resources and that food stamps
buy the groceries. It isn't the same as financial and
emotional support from your own father." Id., at 84a.
The reaction of Sherrod's father may be misguided. It
may be that he should overcome the obstacles the Government has placed in his way, and still maintain some form of
involvement in Sherrod's life. The point, however, is that
he should not have to try.
The financial and emotional cost of losing this connection
with the father may be too much for the child to bear. If so,
the only way to avoid it is for the child to leave the custody
of the mother. This price for continuing to receive support
from the father also is not speculative. At least one of the
families in this case has chosen this course. Mary Medlin has
four children, one of whom, Karen, receives $200 in child support from her father, and another of whom, Jermaine, receives $50 in support. I d., at 27a-28a. Ms. Medlin origi-
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nally received $223 in AFDC for herself and her two other
children. When, as required, she added Karen and J ermaine
to the welfare rolls, her entire family became ineligible
for AFDC. In order to obtain assistance for her family, she
agreed to relinquish custody of Karen to her father. I d.,
at 29a.
Karen may now keep her $200 in child support, and her
mother may now obtain AFDC for herself and her other children. They may no longer, however, live in the same household. The burden of their choice hardly requires elaboration.
"Continuity of relationships, surroundings, and
environmental influence are essential for a child's normal
development." J. Goldstein, A. Freud, & A. Solnit, Beyond
the Best Interests of the Child 31-32 (2d ed. 1979). 17 The
relationship between the child and the custodial parent is a
bond forged by intimate daily association, and severing it unalterably transforms the parent-child relationship. It may
be that parent and child will be able to fashion some type of
new relationship; even if they do, however, each has lost
something of incalculable value.
It is thus clear that in this case the Government "'directly
and substantially' interfere[s] with family living arrangements and thereby burden[s] a fundamental right." Lyng,
- - U. S., at - - , quoting Zablocki, 434 U. S., at 387.
The infringement is direct, because a child whose mother
needs AFDC cannot escape being required to choose between
living with the mother and being supported by the father. It
is substantial because the consequence of that choice is damage to a relationship between parent and child. Furthermore, the Government has created an inherent conflict between the interests of the father and the mother. As the
record in this case testifies, a typical father will feel strongly
that his son should be supported by him and not by public assistance. The typical mother will feel that loss of the faSee also Bowlby, Attachment and Loss: Retrospect and Prospect, 52
Amer. J . Orthopsychiatry 666 (1982).
17
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ther's support is a price worth paying to keep the child with
her. The child may well be swept up in a custody dispute over
which living arrangement is in its best interest, especially
given the recent trend toward easier modification of custody
arrangements. See Wexler, Rethinking the Modification of
Child Custody Decreees, 94 Yale L. J. 757, 760-782 (1985).
In short, the Government has sliced deeply into family life,
pitting father against mother, with the child in the middle.
B
The nature of the interest asserted in this case, as well as
the direct disruption produced by the Government, distin. guishes this case from typical challenges to the operation of
Government benefit programs.
First, unlike those cases on which the Court relies, plaintiff
children receiving child support do not assert that they have
been unfairly denied a Government benefit. Rather, they
claim that the Government has deeply intruded on their relationships with their parents. 18 In Weinberger, supra, we directly acknowledged the difference between these two types
of claims: "Unlike the claims involved in Stanley and
LaFleur, a noncontractual claim to receive funds from the
public treasury enjoys no constitutionally protected status."
422 U. S., at 772 (emphasis added). The children in this case
obviously present claims based on the constitutionally protected interest in family life involved in Stanley and LaFleur.
Their claims thus must be met by more than a mere demonstration that there is some plausible basis for the Government's action.
This leads to a second point. We are willing to accept the
validity of many conditions on participation in Government
programs because this Court has never held that anyone has
18

Members of the plaintiff class also include fathers whose interest in
the parent-child relationship is to be able to support their children. Complaint 4. Obviously, these plaintiffs also are not applicants for Government benefits.
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an absolute right to receive public assistance. The Court
has thus assumed that participation in a benefit program
reflects a decision by a recipient that he or she is better off
by meeting whatever conditions are attached to participation
than not receiving benefits. In assessing the burdens imposed by a program, then, the theory is that whatever reasonable burdens are borne by the recipient are willingly assumed. Thus, for instance, if a child, through its mother,
voluntarily wishes to participate in the AFDC program, the
requirement that child support be assigned to the State is one
of the conditions to which a recipient is deemed to have freely
consented. See 42 U. S. C. § 602(a)(26) (Supp. III 1985).
In this case, however, the burden placed on the child is not
the result of his or her voluntary application for AFDC benefits. Indeed, participants in this lawsuit are children who do
not wish to receive AFDC. Rather, the child must choose
between the father and mother solely because other household members are indigent and desire public assistance. It
is the presence of these persons in the household, not the
child's voluntary application for public assistance, that triggers the requirement that it choose which parental relationship to maintain.
The Government has thus placed a burden on the child's
fundamental interest in a relationship with both parents on
the basis of a factor over which the child has no control.
What we said with respect to illegitimacy in Weber v. Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U. S. 164, 175 (1972), is equally
applicable here: imposing such a burden "is contrary to the
basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear
some relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing.
Obviously, no child is responsible for his birth and penalizing
the illegitimate child is an ineffectual-as well as unjustway of deterring the parent." See also Trimble v. Gordon,
430 U. S. 762, 770 (1977) (children "can affect neither their
parents' conduct nor their own status"). The paradigm of
the willing AFDC participant is inapplicable in this case, for
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the child's fundamental rights are infringed so that other
members of the household can receive the assistance that
they desire. In insisting that the mother use one child's support to purchase AFDC for other household members, the
Government ignores our pronouncement in Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158, 170 (1944): "Parents may be free
to become martyrs themselves. But it does not follow that
they are free . . . to make marytrs of their children before
they have reached the age of full and legal discretion when
they can make that choice for themselves."
Finally, the disruption directly produced by the household
filing requirement distinguishes this case from cases in which
we have upheld Government benefit provisions from a challenge that they interfered with family life. In Lyng, supra,
for instance, we upheld the Food Stamp program's presumption that parents, children, and siblings who live together
constitute a single "household," so that such persons could
not individually apply for benefits as separate households.
We noted that the definition "does not order or prevent any
group of persons from dining together. Indeed, in the overwhelming majority of cases it probably has no effect at all."
ld., at--. In Califano v. Jobst, 434 U. S. 47 (1977), we
upheld a provision whereby a recipient of dependent Social
Security benefits lost those benefits upon marriage to anyone
other than another beneficiary, even though we acknowledged that the provision "may have an impact on a secondary
beneficiary's desire to marry, and may make some suitors
less welcome than others." I d., at 58. These cases reflect
recognition that the extensive activities of Government 1n
modern society inevitably have the potential for creating incentives and disincentives for certain behavior. Certainly,
one could plausibly contend that much of what Government
does, from tax policy to regulatory initiatives, might in some
way have some influence on decisions relating to family life.
Yet such plausible speculation cannot provide the basis for a
constitutional challenge.
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In this case, however, the impact of Government action is
not speculative, but direct and substantial. If a child-support recipient lives with a mother who needs public assistance, AFDC will be provided only if the child either leaves
the household or gives up its right to support from its father.
Determining whether other eligibility requirements for Government assistance will influence family choices may call for
subtle inquiry into the nuances of human motivation. Here,
however, the burden on family life is inescapable, because it
is directly required by the Government as a condition of obtaining benefits. "'Governmental imposition of such a choice
puts the same kind of burden upon [the child's rights] as
would a fine imposed against'" the child for living with
its mother or being supported by its father. Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, - - U. S. - - , - - (1987)
(citation omitted).
The contention in this case is therefore that the Government has burdened the fundamental interest of a child in
maintaining a custodial relationship with its mother and a
support relationship with its father. Such a burden must be
justified by more than a mere assertion that the provision is
rational.

III
Turning first to the Government's purpose in enacting the
provision at issue in this case, the Government urges that the
change in the household filing requirement was meant to be a
"rational means of carrying out Congress' conclusion that
families whose members have access to additional sources _of
income have less need for government assistance than families without access to such income." Brief for United States
41.
This concern for program efficiency is certainly a valid
objective, and serves to justify Governmental action in most
cases. It cannot in itself, however, provide a purpose sufficiently important to justify an infringement on fundamental
constitutional rights. If it could, its reach would be limit-
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less, for it is probably more efficient in most cases for Government to operate without regard to the obstacles of the
Constitution than to attend to them. Nonetheless, "the Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency."
Stanley, supra, at 656. It is true that Congress could, if it
chose, completely eliminate the AFDC program in order to
save money, for this Court has held that no one may claim a
constitutional right to public assistance. Having chosen to
operate such a program, however, it may not invoke the efficiency of that program as a basis for infringing the constitutional rights of recipients. See, e. g., Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U. S. 618, 633 (1969) (in equal protection context, "[t]he
saving of welfare costs cannot justify an otherwise invidious
classification"). Surely no one could contend, for instance
that a concern for limiting welfare outlays could justify mandatory sterilization of AFDC beneficiaries, or the forfeiture
of all personal possessions. "Indeed," as we have said:
"one might fairly say of the Bill of Rights in general, and
the Due Process Clause in particular, that they were designed to protect the fragile values of a vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing concern for efficiency and efficacy that may characterize praiseworthy government
officials no less, and perhaps more, than mediocre ones."
Stanley, supra, at 656.
Thus, the Government's desire to target AFDC payments
more efficiently cannot in itself serve to justify infringement
of the child's fundamental interest in living with its mother
and being supported by its father. Even if a concern for p:r:_ogram efficiency could serve as a sufficiently important objective in this context, however, the Government need not infringe upon family life in order to accomplish it.
It may well be unrealistic to assume that no child support
is available as a common household resource, given the fact
that a child enjoys such common benefits as shelter, utilities,
and food. It is thus reasonable to account for the reality
of household living by assuming that a portion of the child-
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support payment is used to meet the child's share of these
common expenses. Thus, the Government could regard as
household income that portion of the support payment that
represents the child's pro rata share of common expenses.
This calculation could be done easily for each household size,
and would require no case-by-case determinations. Such attribution of income would require no preemption of state
child-support law, since the use of support payments to meet
the child's share of such common expenses is consistent with
state law requirements that child support be used solely for
the benefit of the child. 19
At the same time, such a provision leaves intact the fatherchild-support bond. In making a commitment to meet the
particular needs of his child, the father surely realizes that
some of those needs are common needs for which it is only
fair to seek a contribution from the child. This is far different, however, from assuming that the entire child-support
payment is available for the whole household. The father's
unique relationship is with his child, not with other members
of the household, and the father and child, not the Government, should be the ones to decide if it should continue.
If the Government is concerned that some mothers may be
violating their fiduciary duty to their child by using the support payment for all household members, it could easily require as a condition of AFDC participation that the mother
account for the use of child-support money. If the money is
in fact being used for everyone, the father is not simply supporting his child, but everyone, so that the child has no spe19

See, e. g., N. C. G. S. § 50-13.4(d) (child support payments for minor
child must be paid to custodian "for the benefit of such child"). See also
Goodyear v. Goodyear, 257 N. C. 374, 379 (1962) (parent is trustee for children who receive support, and may use payments only "for the benefit of
[these] children"). It is true that benefits to other household members
may redound to the benefit of the child. There must be some limit to such
attribution of benefits, however, if we are to adhere to our tradition that
the welfare of the individual is not completely reducible to the welfare of
the group.
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cial parental support relationship different from any other
child in the household. In that case, it is fair to require the
assignment of child support to the Government, since this requirement does not represent the child's relinquishment of a
distinctive father-child bond. The assignment provision in
such an instance does no more than reflect the family members' own decision about how the child support should be
used. It may be that the accounting will inform the father
that the money is being used against his wishes, so that he
will demand that it be used for his child. Families may resolve this disagreement in various ways, but the resolution
will reflect the decision of the parents, not the Government,
as to the best way to meet the needs of the child.
If an accounting revealed that some, but not all, of the support were used for the needs of other household members,
the Government would be free to attribute this amount as
household income, and to require the assignment of some
representative portion of the support payment. That portion used or saved for the child's special needs, however,
could not go the Government, for it represents the father's
commitment to meeting the particular needs of his child.
These funds may be used to permit the child to pursue a particular interest, to help defray the cost of special training
necessary because of a learning diability, or to save for the
child's education. Whatever the use to which the money is
put, the child knows that it may look to its father for it. The
allocation of the support payment between the needs of the
child and other household members represents the decision of
family members, not the Government, as to how best to raise
the child.
Finally, to the extent that Congress sought recognition to
the fact that individuals living together enjoy some economies of scale, ante, at--, this could be addressed far less
disruptively. The Government need only require that the
child support recipient be included in the calculation of household size. Since per capita AFDC payments are lower the
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larger the household, this measure would accomplish the
Government's end while not intruding on the parent-child
relationship.
The Government's justification for its direct and substantial infringement on parent-child relationships thus falls
short. As salutary as a desire for cost-effective program
management may be, alone it is not a purpose of adequate
magnitude to warrant such infringement. Even if it were,
the Government need not abandon its desire to target AFDC
more efficiently in order to avoid direct intrusion into the intimate domain of family life. Measures are available that
would achieve a more realistic consideration of household income while still permitting a child to sustain vital bonds with
both its father and mother. As a result, the household filing
requirement cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny. This
conclusion does not represent an effort to second-guess Congress as to the most effective use of its funds, nor does it represent a threat to the discretion that program officials must
inevitably exercise. Rather, it reflects adherence to the
principle that on those rare occasions that the Government
deeply and directly intrudes on basic family relationships,
there must be a powerful justification for doing so.
IV
In The Republic and in The Laws, Plato offered a vision of
a unified society, where the needs of children are met not by
parents but by the Government, and where no intermediate
forms of association stand between the individual and the
State. Plato, The Republic, in The Dialogues of Plato, Vol.
II 163 (B. Jowett transl. 1953); The Laws, id., Vol. IV, at
189. The vision is a brilliant one, but it is not our own:
"Although such measures have been deliberately approved by men of great genius, their ideas touching the
relation between individual and State were wholly different from those upon our institutions rest; and it hardly
will be affirmed that any legislature could impose such
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restrictions upon the people of a State without doing
violence to both letter and spirit of the Constitution."
Meyer, supra, 262 U. S., at 402.
If we are far removed from the Platonic republic, it is because our commitment to diversity and decentralized human
relationships has made us attentive to the danger of Government intrusion on private life. Those who are affected by
the Government in this case are fathers and children who
have sustained a relationship whereby the child is supported
by the father, not dependent on the State. The State has
told the child that if it is to live with a mother not so fortunate, it too must become a dependent of the State. If it does
so, the child's material needs will no longer met by a father's
attention to his particular child. Rather, the child will be
one of many who are supported by the Government, and the
father, powerless to direct assistance to his child, can only
reimburse the Government for supporting the entire household. Such an arrangement calls to mind Aristotle's criticism of the family in Plato's republic: "[E]ach citizen will have
a thousand sons: they will not be the sons of each citizen individually: any and every son will be equally the son of any and
every father; and the result will be that every son will be
equally neglected by every father." Aristotle, Politics 44
(E . Barker trans. 1958). Regardless of the benevolence with
which it is issued, a Government check is no substitute for
the personal support of a loving father.
"Happy families," wrote Tolstoy, "are all alike; every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way." L. Tolstoy, An!la
Karenina 1 (C. Garnet transl. 1978). Contemporary life offers countless ways in which family life can be fractured and
families made unhappy. The children who increasingly live
in these families are entitled to the chance to sustain a special
relationship with both their fathers and their mothers, regardless of how difficult that may be. Parents are entitled
to provide both daily emotional solace and to meet their
child's material needs; the fact that in some families a differ-
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ent parent may take on each role does not diminish the child's
right to the care of both parents. The Government could not
prohibit parents from performing these duties, and what it
cannot do by direct fiat it should not be able to do by economic force. The Government has decreed that the only
way a child can live with its mother and be supported by its
father is if the mother is wealthy enough not to require public
assistance. A child cannot be held responsible for the indigency of its mother, and should not be forced to choose between parents because of something so clearly out of its control. No society can assure its children that there will be no
unhappy families. It can tell them, however, that their Government will not be allowed to contribute to the pain.
I dissent.
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JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opm10n of the Court.
As part of its major effort to reduce the federal deficit
through the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, 98 Stat. 494, Congress amended the statute authorizing Federal Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) 1 to require that a
family's eligibility for benefits must take into account, with
certain specified exceptions, the income of all parents, broth'"'The AFDC program is based on a scheme of cooperative federalism.'
Established by Title IV of the
Social Security Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 627, 'to provide financial assistance to
needy dependent children and the parents or relatives who live with and
care for them,' Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U. S. 251, 253 (1974), the federal
program reimburses each State which chooses to participate with a percentage of the funds it expends. § 403, 42 U. S. C. § 603. In return, the
State must administer its assistance program pursuant to a state plan that
conforms to applicable federal statutes and regulations. § 402, 42 U. S. C.
King v. Smith, 392 U. S. 309, 316 (1968).

§ 602.''

Heckler v. Turner, 470 U. S. 184, 189 (1985).
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ers and sisters living in the same home. 2 The principal
question presented in this appeal is whether that requirement violates the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution when it is applied to require a family wishing to
receive AFDC benefits to include within its unit a child for
whom child support payments are being made by a noncustodial parent.
2

The Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, 98 Stat. 494, which fills over 700
pages of the statutes at large, includes two major divisions, the Tax Reform Act of 1984 and the Spending Reduction Act of 1984. The amendment at issue in this case is found in the latter division, 98 Stat. 1145. As
a result of that amendment, § 402(a)(38) of the Social Security Act, 42
U. S. C. 602(a)(38) (1982 ed., Supp. Ill) now provides, in pertinent part:
"A State plan for aid and services to needy families with children must"(38) provide that in making the determination undet: paragraph (7) with
respect to a dependent child and applying paragraph (8), the State agency
shall (except as otherwise provided in this part) include"(A) any parent of such child, and
"(B) any brother or sister of such child, if such brother or sister meets
the conditions described in clauses (1) and (2) of section 606(a) of this title,
if such parent, brother, or sister is living in the same home as the dependent child, and any income of or available for such parent, brother,
or sister shall be included in making such determination and applying
such paragraph with respect to the family (notwithstanding section 405(j)
of this title, in the case of benefits provided under subchapter II of this
chapter) .... "
Section 406(a), in turn, provides:
"The term 'dependent child' means a needy child (1) who has been deprived of parental support or care by reason of the death, continued absence from the home . . . or physical or mental incapacity of a parent, and
who is living with his father , mother, grandfather, grandmother, brother,
sister, stepfather, stepmother, stepbrother, stepsister, uncle, aunt, first
cousin, nephew, or niece, in a place of residence maintained by one or more
of such relatives as his or their own home, and (2) who is (A) under the age
of eighteen, or (B) at the option of the State, under the age of nineteen and
a full-time student in a secondary school (or in the equivalent level of vocational or technical training), if before he attains age nineteen, he may reasonably be expected to complete the program of such secondary school (or
such training)." 42 U. S. C. § 606(a).
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I

This litigation began in 1970. At that time the federal
statute did not require that all parents and siblings be included in an AFDC filing unit. Thus, for example, if a teenage child had significant income of her own, perhaps from
wages or perhaps in support payments from an absent parent, the other members of her family could exclude her from
the filing unit in order to avoid disqualifying the entire family
from benefits or reducing its level of benefits.
Beaty Mae Gilliard, one of the named class members in the
1970 suit, 3 began receiving public assistance from North Carolina under AFDC in 1962. In February 1970, after her seventh child was born, the State automatically included him in
the filing unit, thereby increasing the family's monthly allotment from $217 to $227 to reflect the difference between the
benefit for a family of seven and the benefit for a family of
eight. Gilliard was, however, also receiving $43.33 each
month in child support from the baby's father. When a formal parental support order was entered in April 1970, the
State credited the support payments against her account and
reduced her monthly benefit to $184. Gilliard sued, contending that she had a statutory right to exclude her seventh child
from the unit and thus to continue to receive the $217 benefit
for a family of seven and also to retain the $43.33 paid by her
youngest child's father. A three-judge District Court
agreed with her reading of the statute and entered an order
requiring the State to reinstate her benefits at the $217 level
and to reimburse her for the improper credits of $43 per
month. Gilliard v. Craig, 331 F. Supp. 587 (WDNC 1971).
The District Court also granted class-wide relief. We af3
The class was comprised of "persons who have been or may be subject
to reduction of AFDC . . . benefits based upon unconstitutional or illegal
claim of credit by administering agencies for outside income and other resources available to some but not all of a family group." Gilliard v. Craig,
331 F. Supp. 587, 588 (WDNC 1971).

·.
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firmed that judgment. 409 U. S. 807 (1972). No constitutional question was decided at that time.
Congress amended the AFDC program in 1975 to require,
as a condition of eligibility, that applicants for assistance
must assign to the State any right to receive child support
payments for any member of the family included in the filing
unit. 4 In response, North Carolina amended its laws to provide that the acceptance of public assistance on behalf of a dependent child would constitute an assignment of any right to
support for that child. See N. C. Gen. Stat. § 110-137
(Supp. 1985). These amendments, however, did not harm
recipients like Gilliard because they did not affect the right to
define the family unit covered by an application and thereby
to exclude children with independent income, such as a child
for whom support payments were being made.
In 1983, the Secretary of Health and Human Services proposed certain amendments to the Social Security Act to "assure that limited Federal and State resources are spent as
· effectively as possible." Letter of 25 May 1983, to the Honorable George Bush, President of the Senate, App. 168-169
(hereinafter Heckler Letter). One of the Secretary's proposals was "to establish uniform rules on the family members
' Section 402(a)(26)(A) provides:
"[A]s a condition of eligibility for aid, each applicant or recipient will be
required"(A) to assign to the State any rights to support from any other person
such applicant may have (i) in his own behalf or in behalf of any other family member for whom the applicant is applying for or receiving aid, and (ii)
which have accrued at the time such assignment is executed .... " 42
U. S. C. § 602(a)(26)(A) (1982 ed., Supp. Ill).
The 197.5 amendment also amended § 402 to .require recipients to:
"cooperate with the State (i) in establishing the paternity of a child born
out of wedlock with respect to whom aid is claimed, and (ii) in obtaining
support payments for such applicant and for a child with respect to whom
such aid is claimed, or in obtaining any other other payments or property
due such applicant or such child .... " 42 U. S. C. § 602 (a)(26)(B) (1982
ed., Supp. Ill).
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who must file together for AFDC, and the situations in which
income must be counted. In general, the parents, sisters,
and brothers living together with a dependent child must all
be included; the option of excluding a sibling with income,
for example, would no longer be available." Ibid. The Secretary stressed that the improvements would result in an
AFDC allocation program that "much more realistically reflects the actual home situation." Id., at 169.
The Secretary's proposal was not enacted in 1983, but one
of the provisions in the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984
(DEFRA) established a standard filing unit for the AFDC
program. The Senate Finance Committee estimated that
the change would save $455,000,000 during the next three fis- ·
cal years. S. Rep. No. 98-169, p. 980 (1984) (hereinafter
Senate Report). It explained the purpose of the amendment
in language that removes any possible ambiguity in the relevant text of the statute: 5
"Present Law
"There is no requirement in present law that parents
and all siblings be included in the AFDC filing unit.
Families applying for assistance may exclude from the
filing unit certain family members who have income
which might reduce the family benefit. For example, a
family might choose to exclude a child who is receiving
social security or child support payments, if the payIn support of the District Court's judgment, appellees have asked us
to adopt a construction of the statute that is completely inconsistent with
the intent of Congress as explained in the Secretary's request for the
legislation, in the Senate Report, and in the Conference Report as well.
Moreover, the arguments are inconsistent with the unambiguous regulations the Secretary has adopted to implement the statute. See 45 CFR
§ 206.10(a)(1)(vii) (1986). The District Court carefully considered these
statutory arguments and rejected them. Gilliard v. Kirk, 633 }". Supp.
1529, 1548 (WDNC 1986). : We agree with that court's analysis of the
meaning of the statute and find no merit in appellees' statutory arguments
advanced in this Court. See also Gorrie v. Bowen, 809 F . 2d 508, 513-516
(CA8 1987).
5
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ments would reduce the family's benefits by an amount
greater than the amount payable on behalf of the
child....
"Explanation of Provision
"The provision approved by the Committee would require States to include in the filing unit the parents and
all dependent minor siblings (except SSI recipients and
any stepbrothers and stepsisters) living with a child who
applies for or receives AFDC ....
"This change will end the present practice whereby
families exclude members with income in order to maximize family benefits, and will ensure that the income of
family members who live together and share expenses is
recognized and counted as available to the family as a
whole." I d., at 980.
See also H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 98-861, p. 1407 (1984).
Because the 1984 amendment forced families to include in
the filing unit children for whom support payments were
being received, the practical effect was that many families'
total income was reduced. 6 The burden of the change was
mitigated somewhat by a separate amendment providing that
the first $50 of child support collected by the State must be
remitted to the family and not counted as income for the purpose of determining its benefit level. 7 See 42 U. S. C.
§602(a)(8)(A)(vi) (1982 ed., Supp. III); 42 U. s·. C. §657(b)(1)
(1982 ed., Supp. Ill). Thus, the net effect of the 1984
• For example, under the July 1985levels of payment in North Carolina,
a family of four with no other income would have received $269. A child's
support income of $100 would therefore reduce the family's AFDC payment to $169 if that child was included in the filing unit. The family would
have a net income of $269. But if the family were permitted to exclude the
child from the unit and only claim the somewhat smaller benefit of $246 for
a family of three, it could have collected that amount plus the excepted
child's $100 and have a net income of $346. See App. 85.
7
Therefore, under our example, n. 6, supra, the net income with the
child included in the unit would have been $319.
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Amendments for a family comparable to Gilliard's would include three changes: (1) the addition of the child receiving
support would enlarge the filing unit and entitle the family to
a somewhat larger benefit; (2) child support would be treated
as family income and would be assigned to the State, thereby
reducing the AFDC benefits by that amount; and (3) the reduction would be offset by $50 if that amount was collected
from an absent parent. In sum, if the assigned support exceeded $50 plus the difference in the benefit level caused by
adding the child or children receiving support, the family
would suffer; if less than $50 and the difference in the benefit
level was collected as support, it would not.
II

After North Carolina adopted regulations to comply with
the 1984 Amendments, some members of the class that had
earlier obtained relief filed a motion to reopen the 1971
decree and obtain further relief on behalf of the class.
The State impleaded the Secretary of Health and Human
Services, contending that if the State's compliance with the
federal statute resulted in any liability to appellees, the Federal Government should share in any payment of additional
AFDC benefits. The District Court found that North Carolina's and the Department of Health and Human Services'
regulations were in conformance with the statute, 8 but conThe Secretary of Health and Human Resources promulgated the following regulation to implement the DEFRA amendment:
"For AFDC purposes only, in order for the family to be eligible, an application with respect to a dependent child must also include, if living in the
same household and otherwise eligible for assistance:
"(A) Any natural or adoptive parent, or stepparent (in the case of States
with laws of general applicability); and
'(B) Any blood-related or adoptive brother or sister." 45 CFR § 206.10
(a)(l)(vii) (1986).
North Carolina's implementing regulations are set forth in the District
Court's opinion. 633 F. Supp., at 1533-1534.
8
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eluded that the statutory scheme violated both the Due Process Clause and the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 9
The court interpreted North Carolina law as imposing a
duty on the mother to use child support money exclusively
for the benefit of the child for whom it had been obtained, 10
and reasoned that a forced assignment of the support money
to the State in exchange for AFDC benefits for the entire
family was a taking of the child's private property. Gilliard
v. Kirk, 633 F. Supp. 1529, 1551-1555 (WDNC 1986). Additionally, the court reasoned that the use of the child's support
money to reduce the Government's AFDC expenditures was
tantamount to punishing of the child for exercising the fundamental right to live with his or her family. /d., at 1557. Because of the serious impact on the autonomy of the familyincluding the child's potential relationship with his or her natural father-"special judicial scrutiny" was considered appropriate, id., at 1555-1557, and the deprivation of property and
liberty effected by the statutory scheme could not, in the
court's view, survive such scrutiny. We noted probable jurisdiction, 479 U. S. - - (1986).
"No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U. S. Const. , Arndt. 5.
10
The District Court relied on the following paragraph of the opinion of
the North Carolina Supreme Court in Goodyear v. Goodyear, 257 N. C.
374, 379, 126 S. E. 2d 113, 117 (1962):
"While defendant [father] was and is obligated to make the monthly payments called for in his contract for the support of his children, plaintiff
[mother] is not the beneficiary of the moneys which defendant must pay.
These moneys belong to the children. Plaintiff is a mere trustee for them.
That part of the payments not reasonably necessary for support and maintenance, she must hold for the benefit of the children and account to them
when they call upon her. She cannot, by contract with another person,
profit at the expense of the children."
The Goodyear opinion did not purport to announce any rule of law unique
to North Carolina; it quoted from Indiana and Iowa opinions and cited
authorities from other jurisdictions.
9
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The District Court was undoubtedly correct in its perception that a number of needy families have suffered, and will
suffer, as a result of the implementation of the DEFRA
amendments to the AFDC program. Such suffering is frequently the tragic by-product of a decision to reduce or to
modify benefits to a class of needy recipients. Under our
structure of government, however, it is the function of Congress-not the courts-to determine whether the savings realized, and presumably used for other critical governmental
functions, are significant enough to justify the costs to the individuals affected by such reductions. The Fifth Amendment "gives the federal courts no power to impose upon [Congress] their views of what constitutes wise economic or social
policy," by telling it how "to reconcile the demands of . . .
needy citizens with the finite resources available to meet
those demands." Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471,
486, 472 (1970). Unless the legislative branch's decisions run
afoul of some constitutional edict, any inequities created by
such decisions must be remedied by the democratic processes. The District Court believed that the amendments at
issue did conflict with both the Due Process Clause and the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 11 We consider
The only Court of Appeals, see Gorrie v. Bowen, 809 F . 2d 508 (CA8
1987), and virtually all of the District Courts, that have addressed challenges to the inclusion of child support or other "exclusive use" funds have
upheld the validity of these amendments, see e. g., Showers v. Cohen, 645
F. Supp. 217 (MD Pa. 1986); Sherrod v. Hegstrom, 629 F. Supp. 150 (Ore.
1985); Huber v. Blinzinger, 626 F. Supp. 30 (ND Ind. 1985); Oliver v. Ledbetter, 624 F. Supp. 325 (ND Ga. 1985); Ardister v. Mansour, 627 F. Supp.
641 (WD Mich. 1986) (denying preliminary injunction); Shonkwiler v.
Heckler, 628 F. Supp. 1013 (SD Ind. 1985) (denying preliminary injunction); Cf. Park v. Coler, 143 Ill. App. 3d 727, 493 N. E. 2d 130 (1986);
but see Lesko v. Bowen, 639 F. Supp. 1152 (ED Wis. 1986), appeal docketed, No. 86-744; Baldwin v. Ledbetter, 647 F. Supp. 623 (ND Ga. 1986),
appeal docketed, No. 86-1140, stay pending appeal granted, 479 U. S . (No. A-448) (1986) (POWELL, Circuit Justice).
11
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these arguments in turn, and reject them. 12

III
The precepts that govern our review of appellees' due
process and equal protection challenges to this program are
similar to those we have applied in reviewing challenges to
other parts of the Social Security Act:
"[O]ur review is deferential. 'Governmental decisions
to spend money to improve the general public welfare in
one way and not another are "not confided to the courts.
The discretion belongs to Congress unless the choice is
clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary power, not an exercise of judgment."' Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U. S.
181, 185 (1976), quoting Helvering v. Davis, 301 U. S.
619, 640 (1937)." Bowen v. Owens, 476 U. S. - - , - (1986).
This standard of review is premised on Congress' "plenary
power to define the scope and the duration of the entitlement
12
After ruling that the DEFRA amendment of AFDC was unconstitutional, the District Court considered the form of relief appellees were entitled to. In addition to granting prospective relief, the Court ordered the
state defendants to "pay retroactive AFDC benefits to all families in North
Carolina whose benefits were denied, reduced or terminated as a result of
the enforcement" of the State regulations. 633 F. Supp., at 1563. In response to the State's argument that the Eleventh Amendment barred such
a retroactive award, the District Court explained that the "State had continuously been bound by the court's 1971 injunction, and that if the State
believed DEFRA had changed the applicable law, it should have sought
modification of the injunction. /d., at 1563-1564. Because we interpret
the District Court's award of both prospective and retroactive relief to rest
on its holding that the DEFRA amendment was unconstitutional, and read
its discussion of the 1971 injunction as responding to the State's claim that
an award of retroactive benefits was barred by the Eleventh Amendment,
see Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 667-668 (1974), our ruling that the
DEFRA amendment is constitutionally valid requires reversal of both the
District Court's award of prospective relief and its award of retroactive
relief.
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to ... benefits, and to increase, to decrease, or to terminate
those benefits based on its appraisal of the relative importance of the recipients' needs and the resources available to
fund the program." Atkins v. Parker, 472 U. S. 115, 129
(1985); see also Schweiker v. Hogan, 457 U. S. 569 (1982);
Califano v. Boles, 443 U. S. 282, 296 (1979); California v.
Aznavorian, 439 U. S. 170 (1978); Weinberger v. Salfi, 422
u. s. 749 (1975).
The District Court had before it evidence that the DEFRA
amendments were severely impacting some families. For
example, some noncustodial parents stopped making their
support payments because they believed that their payments
were helping only the State, and not their children. 633 F.
Supp., at 1542-1543. It is clear, however, that in the admin:..
istration of a fund that is large enough to have a significant
impact on the Nation's deficit, general rules must be examined in light of the broad purposes they are intended to
serve. 13 The challenged amendment unquestionably serves
Congress' goal of decreasing federal expenditures. See Senate Report, at 981 (estimating that amendment in AFDC program will save $455 million during fiscal years 1984 through
1987); 130 Cong. Rec. S4099 (Apr. 9, 1984) (remarks of Sen.
Dole). The evidence that a few noncustodial parents were
willing to violate the law by not making court-ordered support payments does not alter the fact that the entire program
has resulted in saving huge sums of money.
The rationality of the amendment denying a family the
right to exclude a supported child from the .filing unit is also
supported by the Government's separate interest in distributing benefits among competing needy families in a fair way.
Given its perceived need to make cuts in the AFDC budget,
13

"General rules are essential if a fund of this magnitude is to be administered with a modicum of efficiency, even though such rules inevitably
produce seemingly arbitrary consequences in some individual cases.
Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749, 776." Califano v. Jobst, 434 U. S. 47,
53 (1977).
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·Congress obviously sought to identify a group that would suffer less than others as a result of a reduction in benefits.
When considering the plight of two five-person families, one
of which receives no income at all while the other receives
regular support payments for some of the minor children, it is
surely reasonable for Congress to conclude that the former is
in greater need than the latter. This conclusion is amply
supported by Congress' assumption that child support payments received are generally beneficial to the entire family
unit, see Senate Report, at 980, and by "the common sense
proposition that individuals living with others usually have
reduced per capita costs because many of their expenses are
shared." Termini v. Califano, 611 F. 2d 367, 370 (CA2
1979); see also Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U. S. - - , - - (1986). 14
It was therefore rational for Congress to adjust the AFDC
program to reflect the fact that support money generally provides significant benefits for entire family units. This conclusion is not undermined by the fact that there are no doubt
"An assumption that child support payments to families receiving
AFDC benefits are typically used for the entire family's needs is entirely
reasonable. See Senate Report, at 980 (amendment will "ensure that the
income of family members who live together and share expenses is recognized"). This conclusion does not rest on an assumption that custodial parents routinely violate state law restrictions on the use of support money.
For the requirement that the support income be used for the "benefit" of
the child does not preclude its use for common expenses. Moreover, the
custodial parent's duty to benefit the supported child is not necessarily
served simply by spendirig more money on him or her than on other children living in the same home. As the District Court recognized, nothing
in North Carolina law requires a custodial parent to focus only on the economic interest of the child receiving support without taking into account
the emotional and psychological welfare of the child. Congress' finding
that custodial parents were routinely using the support funds for the entire
family thus reflects the reality that such use is typically proper since expenditures for an entire family unit typically benefit each member of the
household. We do not question Congress' reliance on the Secretary of
Health and Human Services' assurance that counting child support income
as part of the family income "much more realistically reflects the actual
home situation." Heckler Letter, App. 168-169.
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many families in which some-or perhaps all-of the support
money is spent in a way that does not benefit the rest of the
family. In determining how best to allocate limited funds
among the extremely large class of needy families eligible
for AFDC benefits, Congress is entitled to rely on a classwide presumption that custodial parents have used, and may
legitimately use, support funds in a way that is beneficial to
entire family units. As we have repeatedly explained:
"If the classification has some 'reasonable basis,' it does
not offend the Constitution simply because the classification 'is not made with mathematical nicety or because in
practice it results in some inequality.' Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61, 78. 'The problems
of government are practical ones and may justify, if they
do not require, rough accommodations-illogical, it may
be, and unscientific.' Metropolis Theatre Co. v. City of
Chicago, 228 U. S. 61, 69-70. "A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably
may be conceived to justify it.' McGowan v. Maryland,
366 U. S. 420, 426.'' Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S.,
at 485.
See also Weinberger v. Salji, 422 U. S., at 785. We have no
doubt that the DEFRA amendment satisfies this test. 15
Appellees argue (and the District Court ruled), however,
that finding that Congress acted rationally is not enough to
sustain this legislation. Rather, they claim that some form
Congress' presumption is similar to the one made in § 402(a)(31),
42 U. S. C. § 602(a)(31), which provides that portions of a stepparent's
income are to be considered as part of the family income for AFDC purposes. In Brown v. Heckler, 589 F. Supp. 985 (ED Pa. 1984), affirmed,
760 F. 2d 255 (CA3 1985), the court explained that the presumption that
a stepparent will assist in supporting his or her spouse's children is
rational, even though stepparents are under no legal duty to assist the
children, and not every stepparent does. See also Kollett v. Harris, 619
F. 2d 134 (CA11980) (holding that inclusion of stepparent's income as available to child in the Supplemental Security Income program was not unconstitutionally irrational).
'

6
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of "heightened scrutiny" is appropriate because the amendment interferes with a family's fundamental right to live in
the type of family unit it chooses. 16 We conclude that the
District Court erred in subjecting the DEFRA amendment to
any form of heightened scrutiny. That some families may
decide to modify their living arrangements in order to avoid
the effect of the amendment, does not transform the amendment into an act whose design and direct effect is to "intrud[e] on choices concerning family living arrangements."
Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494, 499 (1977). 17 As
was the case with the marriage-related provision upheld in
Califano v. Jobst, 434 U. S. 47 (1977), "Congress adopted
this rule in the course of constructing a complex social welfare system that necessarily deals with the intimacies of family life. This is not a case in which government seeks to foist
orthodoxy on the unwilling." ld., at 54, n. 11.
Last Term we rejected a constitutional challenge to a provision in the Federal Food Stamp Program, which determines eligibility and benefit levels on a "household" rather
than an individual basis. Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U. S. - (1986). 18 We held that the guarantee of equal treatment in
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment was not vio16

For example, the District Court had before it an affidavit from one
mother who stated that she had sent a child to live with the child's father
in order to avoid the requirement of including that child, and the support
received from the child's father, in the AFDC unit. 633 F . Supp., at
1537-1538.
17
If the DEFRA amendment's indirect effects on family living arrangements were enough to subject the statute to heightened scrutiny, then the
entire AFDC program might also be suspect since it provides benefits only
to ~eedy families without two resident parents. Surely this creates incentive for some needy parents to live separately. The answer, of course, is
that these types of incentives are the unintended consequences of many social welfare programs, and do not call the legitimacy qf the programs into
question.
18
The District Court denied appellants' motion for reconsideration in
light of our decision in Lyng. App. to Juris. Statement in No. 86-509,
p. 107a.
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lated by the statutory requirement that generally treated
parents, children, and siblings who lived together as a single
household, and explained:
"The disadvantaged class is that comprised by parents,
children, and siblings. Close relatives are not a 'suspect' or 'quasi-suspect' class. As a historical matter,
they have not been subjected to discrimination; they do
not exhibit obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics that define them as a discrete group; and they
are not a minority or politically powerless. See, e. g.,
Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427
U. S. 307, 313-314 (1976) (per curiam). In fact, quite
the contrary is true.
· "Nor does the statutory classification 'directly and
substantially' interfere with family living arrangements
and thereby burden a fundamental right. Zablocki v.
Redhail, 434 U. S. 374, 386-387, and n. 12 (1978). See
id., at 403-404 (STEVENS, J., concurring); Califano v.
Jobst, 434 U. S. 47, 58 (1977)." · I d., a t - .
In light of this, we concluded in Lyng that the "District Court
erred in judging the constitutionality of the statutory distinction under 'heightened scrutiny.'" I d., at--. In this case
the District Court committed the same error. As in Lyng,
the standard of review here is whether "Congress had a rational basis" for its decision. I d., at - - . And as in Lyng,
"the justification for the statutory classification is obvious."
I d., at - - . The provisions at issue do not violate the Due
Process Clause. 19
Nor is there any merit in the contention that the assignment provision,
see supra, at 4, and n. 4, violates the Due Process Clause. Once it is determined that it is permissible to include all members of the family in the
unit, the assignment of the benefits typically has no adverse effect on the
child receiving support. To the contrary, through the assignment provision the Government takes over the responsibility of making sure that
noncustodial parents actually perform their child support obligations. The
State also bears the risk of nonpayment of support, since the family re19
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IV
Aside from holding that the amendment violated the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and its equal protection component, The District Court iJ?,validated the DEFRA
amendment as a taking of private property without just compensation. The court based this holding on the premise that
a child for whom support payments are made has a right to
have the support money used exclusively in his or her "best
interest." Yet, the court reasoned, the requirements (1)
that a custodial parent who applies for AFDC must include a
child's support money in computing family income, and (2)
that the support must be assigned to the State, effectively
converts the support funds that were once to be used exclusively for the child's best interests into an AFDC check
which, under federal law, must be used for the benefit of all
the children. §405, 42 U. S.C. §605. Therefore, the District Court held that the state was "taking" that child's right
to exclusive use of the support money. In addressing this
issue, it is helpful to look first at whether the state "takes"
the child's property when it considers the support payments
as part of the family's income in computing AFDC eligibility.
We will then consider whether the requirement that support
payments be assigned to the State requires a finding that the
amendments violate the taking prohibition.
Some perspective on the issue is helpful here. Had no
AFDC program ever existed until 1984, and had Congress
then instituted a program that took into account support payceives the identical amount of AFDC (although not the $50 supplement)
whether or not the absent parent makes payments. In the first ten years
following the adoption of the assignment requirement in 1975, legal paternity was established for more than 1.5 million children, more than 3.5 million support orders were established, and $6.8 billion in support obligations
was collected on behalf of children in AFDC families. Office of Child Support Enforcement, U. S. Dept. of Health & Human Services, A Decade of
Child Support Enforcement 1975-1985: Tenth Annual Report to Congress
for the Period Ending September 30, 1985, pp. iii, 6, 9-10 (1985).
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ments that a family receives, it is hard to believe that we
would seriously entertain an argument that the new benefit
program constituted a taking. Yet, somehow, once benefits
are in place and Congress sees a need to reduce them in order
to save money and to distribute limited resources more
fairly, the "takings" label seems to have a bit more plausibility. For legal purposes though, the two situations are
identical. See Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Social
Security Entrapment, 477 U. S. - - (1986). Congress is
not, by virtue of having instituted a social welfare program,
bound to continue it at all, much less at the same benefit
level. Thus, notwithstanding the technical legal arguments
that have been advanced, it is imperative to recognize that
the amendment at issue merely incorporates a definitional
element into an entitlement program. It would be quite
strange indeed if, by virtue of an offer to provide benefits to
needy families through· the entirely voluntary AFDC program, Congress or the States were deemed to have taken
some of those very family members' property.
The basic requirement that the AFDC filing unit must include all family members living in the home, and therefore
that support payments made on behalf of a member of the
family must be considered in determining that family's level
of benefits, does not even arguably take anyone's property.
The family members other than the child for whom the support is being paid certainly have no taking claim, since it is
clear that they have no protected property rights to continued benefits at the same level. See Public Agencies Opposed to Social Security Entrapment, supra. Nor does the
simple inclusion of the support income in the benefit calculation have any legal effect on the child's right to have it used
for his or her benefit. To the extent that a child has the
right to have the support payments used in his "best interest," he or she fully retains that right. Of course, the effect
of counting the support payments as part of the filing unit's
income often reduces the family's resources , and hence in-
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creases the chances that sharing of the support money will be
appropriate. See n. 13, supra. But given the unquestioned
premise that the Government has a right to reduce AFDC
benefits generally, that result does not constitute a taking of
private property without just compensation.
The only possible legal basis for appellees' takings claim,
therefore, is the requirement that an applicant for AFDC
benefits must assign the support payments to the State,
which then will remit the amount collected to the custodial
parent to be used for the benefit of the entire family. This
legal transformation in the status of the funds, the argument
goes, modifies the the child's interest in the use of the money
so dramatically that it constitutes a taking of the child's
property. As a practical matter, this argument places form
over substance, and labels over reality. Although it is true
that money which was earmarked for a specific child's or
.children's "best interest" becomes a part of a larger fund
available for all of the children, the difference between these
concepts is, as we have discussed, more theoretical than
practical. 20
In evaluating whether governmental regulation of property constitutes a "taking" we have "eschewed the development of any set formula ... and have relied instead on ad
hoc, factual inquiries into the circumstances of each particuIn analyzing the effect of the assignment it is again instructive to ask
what would happen to the support payments if there were no AFDC program at all. In that case, it would appear that custodial parents would
have to use a much greater portion of the support payments to sustain the
family unit, since it could hardly be deemed in the child's best interest for
his custodial parent and siblings to have no funds whatsoever. The overall ·
practical effect of the AFDC program (even after the 1984 amendment),
therefore, is to enhance the probability that a child whose custodial parent
is receiving support payments in the child's behalf will obtain direct economic benefit from those funds, in addition to the benefits that result from
preserving the family unit. A reduction in that enhancement is no more a
taking than any other reduction in a Social Security program.
20
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lar case." Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 475
u. s. 211, 224 (1986).
.
"To aid in this determination, however, we have identified three factors which have 'particular significance':
(1) 'the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant'; (2) 'the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations'; and
(3) 'the character of the governmental action.' Penn
Central Transportation Co., [438 U. S. 104,] 124.'' Id.,
at 224-225.
Here, each of these three factors refutes the conclusion that
there has been a taking.
First, in evaluating the economic impact of the assignment,
it is important to remember that it is the impact on the child,
not on the entire family unit, that is relevant. Thus, the fact
that the entire family's net income may be reduced does not
necessarily mean that the amount of money spent for the benefit of a supported child will be any less than the amount of
the noncustodial parent's support payments. The reality is
that the money will usually continue to be used in the same
manner that it was previously since the typical AFDC parent
will have used the support money as part of the general family fund even without its being transferred through AFDC.
Seen. 13, supra. Moreover, any diminution in the value of
the support payments for the child is mitigated by the extra
$50 that the family receives as a result of the assignment, by
the extra AFDC benefits that are received by the inclusion
of an additional family member in the unit, and by the fact
that the State is using its own enforcement power to collect
the support payments, and is bearing the risk of nonpayment
in any given month. Whatever the diminution in value of
the child's right to have support funds used for his or her
"exclusive" benefit may be, it is not so substantial as to constitute a taking under our precedents. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U. S. - - , - (1987); Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U. S. 255, 260 (1980); Penn
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Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U. S. 104,
131 (1978).
Second, the child receiving support payments holds no
vested protectable expectation that his or her parent will
continue to receive identical support payments on the child's
behalf, and that the child will enjoy the same rights with respect to them. See Layton v. Layton, 263 N. C. 453, 456,
139 S. E. 2d 732, 734 (1965) (support is "not a property right
of the child"). The prospective right to support payments,
and the child's expectations with respect to the use of such
funds, are clearly subject to modification by law, be it
through judicial decree, state legislation, or Congressional
enactments. See N. C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.7 (1984) (modification of order for child support). For example, one of the
chief criteria in assessing a child-support obligation is the
noncustodial parent's ability to make payments, see Coggins
v. Coggins, 260 N. C. 765, 133 S. E. 2d 700 (1963); Douglas,
Factors in Determining Child Support, 36 Juvenile & Family
Court Journal, No. 3, p. 27 (1985), and an adverse change in
that parent's ability may, of course, require a modification of
the decree. 2 J. Atkinson, Modern Child Custody Practice
§ 10.25, pp. 527-528 (1986) (discussing reductions in support).
Any right to have the State force a noncustodial parent to
make payments is, like so many other legal rights (including
AFDC payments themselves), subject to modification by "the
public acts of government." Reichelderfer v. Quinn, 287
U. S. 315, 319 (1932); see generally Public Agencies Opposed
to Social Security Entrapment, 477 U. S., at--. As the
District Court explained, Congress, and the States, through
their implementing statutes and regulations, have modified
those rights through passage of (and the States' compliance
with) the DEFRA amendments. See 633 F. Supp., at 15481551; Gorrie v. Bowen, 809 F. 2d 508, 521 (CA8 1987). This
prospective change in the child's expectations concerning future use of support payments is far from anything we have
ever deemed a taking.
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Finally, the character of the governmental action here militates against a finding that the States or Federal Government unconstitutionally take property through the AFDC
program. It is obviously necessary for the Government to
make hard choices and to balance various incentives in deciding how to allocate benefits in this type of program. But a
decision to include child support as part of the family income
certainly does not implicate the type of concerns that the
takings clause protects. This is by no means an enactment
that forces "some people alone to bear public burdens which,
in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public
as a whole." Armstrong v. United States, 364 U. S. 40, 49
(1960).
The law does not require any custodial parent to apply for
AFDC benefits. Surely it is reasonable to presume that a
parent who does make such an application does so because
she or he is convinced that the family as a whole-as well as
each child committed to her or his custody-will be better off
with the benefits than without. In making such a decision,
the parent is not taking a child's property without just compensation; nor is the State doing so when it responds to that
decision by supplementing the collections of support money
with additional AFDC benefits.

v
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Stewart described
the courts' role in cases such as this:
"We do not decide today that the . . . regulation is
wise, that it best fulfills the relevant social and economic
objectives that [Congress] might ideally espouse, or that
a more just and humane system could not be devised.
Conflicting claims of morality and intelligence are raised
by opponents and proponents of almost every measure,
certainly including the one before us. But the intractable economic, social, and even philosophical problems
presented by public welfare assistance programs are not
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the business of this Court. The Constitution may impose certain procedural safeguards upon systems of welfare administration, Goldberg v. Kelly, ante, p. 254.
But the Constitution does not empower this Court to
second-guess . . . officials charged with the difficult
responsibility of allocating limited public welfare funds
among the myriad of potential recipients." Dandridge
v. Williams, 397 U. S., at 487.
The judgment of the District Court is
Reversed.
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